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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 61 MARCH 1963 No. 5 
A RADICAL RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SELLER'S 
DAMAGES: MICHIGAN RESULTS COMPARED 
Robert]. Harris* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
THIS is the second in a series of articles concerned with the measurement of expectation damages1 in contract cases where 
the plaintiff is a "seller."2 In the first article3 my notions of how 
damages should be measured in such cases were set forth. This 
article restates those views4 and considers the results of relevant 
Michigan Supreme Court decisions. Subsequent articles will com-
pare my notions with the case law of California and New York, 
and with the case law which has developed under the Uniform 
Sales Act. 
Rules of law treating the measure of expectation damages 
must answer four questions: (I) what is to be valued; (2) what 
technique of valuation should be used; (3) which party has the 
burden of going forward to prove the value; (4) how should the 
value, once ascertained, be taken into account. 
Conventional judge-made and statutory law on expectation 
damage measurement consists of three discrete bodies of authority: 
(I) statements of the abstract guiding policies; (2) what can be 
called "parochial damage formulae"; and (3) scattered rulings on 
the burden of proof. The statements of abstract guiding policies, 
recognized in Michigan as elsewhere, can be summarized thus: 
(I) unless one of the following five policies would be thwarted, 
plaintiff should recover a sum which, when added to the benefits 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the very extensive help of Kenneth Graham of the California bar. · 
1 Expectation damages are damages whose prime function is to make plaintiff as 
well off as if the contract had been fully performed. 
2 "Seller" is used here to include anyone whose performance is more than or different 
from payment of money. It includes sellers of realty, services and personalty, as well as 
bailors and lessors. For the rationale of the definition, see text infra at 858. 
3 Harris, A General Theory for Measuring Seller's Damages for Total Breach of 
Contract, 60 l\IICH. L. REv. 577 (1962). 
4 Some changes have been made in the theory presented in the prior article, chiefly 
regarding burden of proof and the lost volume problem. The present article, unlike 
the prior one, is not confined to total breach cases. 
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he already received under the contract, will give him an economic 
status5 identical to the one he would have enjoyed had the con-
tract been performed precisely as agreed; 6 (2) there is no recovery 
for items of loss unforeseeable to defendant at the time of contract-
ing;7 (3) there is no recovery for those consequences of breach 
which plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable self-protective 
care;8 (4) all of plaintiff's gains causally related to the breach must 
be taken into account in measuring damages, 9 whether or not 
plaintiff was obligated by the mitigation notion to incur the risks 
that were involved in achieving the particular gain;10 (5) all items 
not proved with sufficient certainty are to be ignored in damage 
measurement;11 (6) all of plaintiff's expenditures in reasonable 
5 The general rule denies recovery for mental anguish. See Hall v. Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 325 Mich. 35, 37 N.W.2d 702 (1949); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1076 (1951) 
[hereinafter cited as CORBIN]; R.EsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 341 (1932) [hereinafter cited 
as R.EsrATEMENT]. There are rare exceptions. See Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 
N.W.2d 816 (1957); McConnell v. United States Express Co., 179 Mich. 522, 146 N.W. 
428 (1914); Humphrey v. Michigan United Rys., 166 Mich. 645, 132 N.W. 447 (19ll). 
6 See Balcom v. Tribbett, 197 Mich. 620, 627, 164 N.W. 261, 262 (1917); Fell v. New-
berry, 106 Mich. 542, 543, 64 N.W. 474 (1895); Petrie v. Lane, 67 Mich. 454, 458, 35 
N.W. 70, 72 (1887). See also Harris, supra note 3, at 577 n.3. 
7 This requirement is variously expressed as involving foreseeability, tacit assent to 
liability by defendant, that the item of loss be the natural and probable consequence 
of breach, that it arise directly from the breach. See, e.g., Huler v. Nasser, 322 Mich. 1, 
8, 33 N.W.2d 637, 640 (1948) ("not damages within the contemplation of the parties'); 
Wetmore&: Wetmore v. Pattison, 45 Mich. 439, 441, 8 N.W. 67, 68 (1881) ("damages ••• 
such as flow directly from his own default'); Cuddy v. Major, 12 Mich. 368, 370 (1864) 
("an intention on the part of the vendor to assume an enlarged engagement"); Clark 
v. Moore, 3 Mich. 55, 60 (1853) ("not • . • the natural and proximate consequences 
of the breach'). See also the extensive citation of Michigan cases in Frederick v. Hille-
brand, 199 Mich. 333, 342, 165 N.W. 810, 813 (1917). See generally 5 CORBIN § 1007; 
McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 137-41 (1935) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]; R.EsrATEMENT 
§ 330. 
s This is known as the "duty to mitigate damages" or the "doctrine of avoidable 
consequences," and is recognized in Michigan. See Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255, 
200 N.W. 252 (1924); Beebe v. Cullinane, 214 Mich. 37, 181 N.W. 1016 (1921); Savage 
&: Farnum v. Drs. K. &: K.'s U.S. Medical &: Surgical Ass'n, 59 Mich. 400, 26 N.W. 652 
(1886). See generally 5 CORBIN § 1039; McCORMICK §§ 33-42; R.EsrATEMENT § 336; Annot., 
81 A.L.R. 282 (1932). But see White &: Carter, Ltd. v. McGregor, [1962] 2 Weekly L.R. 
17 (H.L.), discussed in Goodhart, Measure of Damages When a Contract Is Repudiated, 
78 L.Q. REV. 263 (1962). 
9 See Harrington-Wiard v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 166 Mich. 276, 131 N.W. 559 (1911); 
Milligan v. Sligh Furniture Co., 111 Mich. 629, 70 N.W. 133 (1897); Petrie v. Lane, 67 
Mich. 454, 35 N.W. 70 (1887). See also 5 CoRBIN § 1041; McCORMICK § 160. 
10 There is no Michigan case on point. Apparently the only authority in the United 
States for this proposition is Griflin v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp., 132 Kan. 843, 297 
Pac. 662 (1931). The commentators cited in note 8 supra are in accord. See also British 
Westinghouse Elec. &: Mann Co. v. Underground Elec. Ry., [1912] A.C. 673 (dictum); 
Cock.bum v. Trusts &: Guarantee Co., 55 Can. Sup. Ct. 264, 269-70, 37 D.L.R. 701, 704 
(1917), affirming 38 Ont. L.R. 396, 33 D.L.R. 159 (App. Div. Sup. Ct. 1917). 
11 See Stephany v. Hunt Bros. Co., 62 Cal. App. 638, 217 Pac. 797 (1923); Isbell 
v. Anderson Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 136 N.W. 457 (1912); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. 
Corbit, 127 Mich. 473, 86 N.W. 954 (1901); Stevens v. Yale, 113 Mich. 680, 72 N.W. 5 
(1897); Schoenberg v. Forrest, 253 S.W .2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); 5 CORBIN § 1020; 
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efforts to avoid the consequences of breach can be recovered,12 
whether or not the effort ultimately proves successful.13 
A typical "parochial damage formula" appears in section 64, 
subsection 3, of the Uniform Sales Act: 14 
"Section 64. Action for damages for non-acceptance of 
goods .... 
"(3) where there is an available market for the goods in 
question, the measure of damages is, in the absence of special 
circumstances showing proximate damage of a greater amount, 
the difference between the contract price and the market or 
current price at the time or times when the goods ought to 
have been accepted, or, if no time was fixed for acceptance, 
then at the time of the refusal to accept." 
Another typical one, used where plaintiff is a building con-
tractor and defendant-owner committed a total breach, appears in 
Restatement of Contracts, section 346(2)(a): 
"the entire contract price and compensation for unavoidable 
special harm that the defendant had reason to foresee when 
the contract was made, less installments already paid and the 
cost of completion that the builder can reasonably save by 
not completing the work. ... "15 
Yet another, this quoted from Corbin on Contracts, governs 
cases in which plaintiff is an employee wrongfully discharged by 
defendant-employer before plaintiff substantially completed the 
service of a particular period for which a definite wage installment 
was the agreed equivalent. The measure is "the total amount of 
the unpaid wages that were promised to him for his service, less 
McCORMICK §§ 25-32; REsTATEMENT § 331(1); Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 317 (1950); Annot., 
78 A.L.R. 858 (1932). 
12 See Hartford City Paper Co. v. Enterprise Paper Co., 86 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 
1949); National Commodity Corp. v. American Fruit Growers, Inc., 45 Del. 169, 70 A.2d 
28 (1949); Taylor v. Goldsmith, 228 Mich. 259, 200 N.W. 254 (1924); Federal Bond 
&: Mortgage Co. v. Burstein, 222 Mich. 88, 192 N.W. 549 (1923); Piowaty v. Sheldon, 
167 Mich. 218, 132 N.W. 517 (1911); Berquist v. N. J. Olsen Co., 165 Minn. 406, 206 N.W. 
931 (1925); Lake County Pine Lumber Co. v. Underwood Lumber Co., 140 Ore. 19, 12 
P.2d 324 (1932): 5 CORBIN § 1044; McCORMICK § 42; REsTATEMENT § 336(2); Annot., 84 
A.L.R. I7l (1933). 
13 There is no Michigan authority for this point. See Development Co. of America 
v. King, 170 Fed. 923 (2d Cir. 1909); Baker v. Mode Millinery Co., 193 Ill. App. 507 
(1915); Rench v. Hayes Equip. Mfg. Co., 134 Kan. 865, 8 P .2d 346 (1932); 5 CORBIN 
§ 1044; REsTATEMENT § 336(2). 
14 MrcH. CoMP. LAws § 440.64 (1948). 
10 This formula is used in Michigan. See Nurmi v. Beardsley, 284 Mich. 165, 278 
N.W. 805 (1938); Scheible v. Klein, 89 Mich. 376, 50 N.W. 857 (1891); Wells v. Board 
of Educ., 78 Mich. 260, 44 N.W. 267 (1889). 
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the amount that he can earn by making reasonable effort to obtain 
similar service under another employer."16 
Each parochial damage formula is specifically tailored for a 
single kind of breach (such as non-performance, rather than tardy 
or defective performance), for a single kind of contract (such as 
sale of goods, rather than bailment or sale of realty or sale of serv-
ices), for acts by a certain party (such as plaintiff-seller, rather than 
plaintiff-buyer). In theory, at least, there are as many of these 
parochial rules as there are fact situations to be litigated. 
The last of the three conventional bodies of doctrine concerns 
burden of proof. The case law on this topic usually is too frag-
mentary to provide anything deserving the name "rules." Typi-
cally it consists of (I) scattered holdings devoid of generalization17 
and (2) oscillating judicial endorsements of two overly broad and 
inconsistent positions. One of these shibboleths is to the effect that 
"plaintiff has the burden of proving his damages"18-suggesting 
that plaintiff always has the burden of proving all aspects of dam-
age measurement, including the value of what he saved or should 
have saved because of the breach. The other purported command 
provides that "defendant, being the party at fault, has the burden 
of proving mitigation-what plaintiff saved or should have saved 
thanks to breach."19 Probably in all states, despite the presence of 
one or both of these supposed rules in the judicial literature, there 
are some situations in which defendant consistently has the burden 
of proving what he saved or should have saved,20 and there are 
16 5 CoRBIN § 1095, at 431. See also Gallino v. Boland, 221 Mich. 502, 191 N.W. 222 
(1922); Gerardo v. Brush, 120 Mich. 405, 79 N.W. 646 (1899); Stearns v. Lake Shore 
&: Mich. So. Ry., 112 Mich. 651, 71 N.W. 148 (1897). 
17 See, e.g., Milligan v. Haggerty, 296 Mich .. 62, 295 N.W. 560 (1941); McColl v. 
Wardowski, 280 Mich. 374, 273 N.W. 736 (1937); International Textbook Co. v. Schulte, 
151 Mich. 149, 114 N.W. 1031 (1908); Brownlee v. Bolton, 44 Mich. 218, 6 N.W. 657 
(1880); Annots., 17 A.L.R.2d 968 (1951), 134 A.L.R. 242 (1941). The problem is barely 
mentioned in the Restatement, probably because it was not considered to be substantive. 
But see R.EsrATEMENT § 333 (d) (defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff 
made a losing contract in reliance damage cases). 
18 See Shapiro v. Fyrac Mfg. Co., 264 Mich. 280, 249 N.W. 851 (1933); Mount Ida 
School for Girls v. Rood, 253 Mich. 482, 235 N.W. 227 (1931); Callender v. Myers 
Regulator Co., 250 Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930). Cf. R.EsrATEMENT § 333(d). 
19 See Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., 147 Mich. 702, 111 N.W. 343 (1907); 
Carver v. School Dist., 113 Mich. 524, 71 N.W. 859 (1897); Farrell v. School Dist., 98 
Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053 (1893). See also R.EsrATEMENT § 331, comment c ("Doubts are 
generally resolved against the party committing the breach of contract.'). 
20 See cases where plaintiff is a full-time employee wrongfully discharged before 
the end of his term contract. E.g., Ogden v. George F. Alger Co., 353 Mich. 402, 91 
N.W.2d 288 (1958); Edgecomb v. School Dist., 341 Mich. 106, 67 N.W.2d 87 (1954); 
Farrell v. School Dist., supra note 19. See also Annots., 41 A.L.R.2d 955 (1955); 134 A.L.R. 
242 (1941). 
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other situations in which this burden is routinely placed upon 
plaintiff.21 
Conventional doctrine does not address itself directly to the 
choice among valuation techniques, although the various paro-
chial damage formulae give some clues. Underlying this series of 
articles is an assumption that the doctrine makes mor~ sense when 
restated in valuation terms. These articles involve an effort to re-
state in such terms one sector of expectation damage law-the 
part that governs cases in which plaintiff is a "seller."22 
A. A Single General Rule 
A single general rule can answer two of the four basic questions 
in all expectation damage cases.23 The rule is: "Plaintiff should 
recover (minuend minus subtrahend) plus incidental damages."24 
The "minuend" is always the value to plaintiff25 of the difference 
21 See cases where plaintiff is a seller of staple goods. E.g., Peters v. Cooper, 95 Mich. 
191, 54 N.W. 694 (1893); Brownlee v. Bolton, 44 Mich. 218, 6 N.W. 657 (1880). See also 
.Annot., 130 A.L.R. 1336 (1941). 
22 By and large the question of the date on which value should be measured will 
not be treated. For discussion of this vexing question, see 5 CORBIN § 1005; McCORMICK 
§ 48; REsrATEMENT § 338; Beale, Damages Upon Repudiation of a Contract, 17 YALE L.J. 
443 (1908); Editorial, 66 CENT. L.J. 365, 383 (1908); Note, 37 MINN. L. R.Ev. 215 (1953); 
Comment, 17 YALE L.J. 611 (1908); Annot., 34 A.L.R. 114 (1925). 
23 The rule is thought to be useful whether plaintiff is the "seller" or not; whether 
the subject matter of the contract is realty, personalty, services, or some combination; 
whether the transfer of property is permanent (sale or exchange), or temporary (bail-
ment or lease); whether the promises were aleatory or not; whether the breach was 
"total" or "partial"; whether the defendant's default was non-performance, defective 
performance, or tardy performance; whether the breach was anticipatory or not; whether 
the contract was unilateral, bilateral, or a non-bargain agreement supported by some 
substitute for consideration. (What did the medicine man say? " ... will cure lumbago, 
falling arches, colic and warts; grow hair; purify the blood; steady the nerves; and 
bring the bloom of youth to your dear grandmother's withered cheek.') 
24 "Minuend plus subtrahend" appears in parentheses to show that it is the arith-
metic, not algebraic, sum of the parenthetical matter and incidental damages which 
is recovered. If the minuend is $50, the subtrahend $75 and the incidental damages $5, 
plaintiff recovers $5, not zero. His $5 recovery is really a reliance damage recovery; a 
zero recovery would be called for were the goal to give plaintiff the equivalent of full 
performance on both sides-the expectation remedy. This assumes that plaintiff's reliance 
damage remedy can exceed what he could recover on an expectation damage theory. 
The Michigan law is in accord. See Reynolds v. Levi, 122 Mich. 115, 80 N.W. 999 (1899); 
cf. Feldman v. Wear-U-Well Shoe Co., 191 Mich. 73, 157 N.W. 395 (1916). 
There is scattered authority in other states for the proposition that reliance damages 
must be reduced by the sum plaintiff saved by not performing the balance of the 
contract. Sec L. Albert &: Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949); 
REsrATEMENT § 333(a); Annot., 17 .A..L.R.2d 1300 (1951). If "saved" means "expenses not 
incurred" as well as "resale losses not sustained," in these other states the plaintiff can 
never recover, as reliance damages, more than he could have recovered as expectation 
damages. Thus, in such states plaintiff should recover the algebraic sum of the paren-
thetical matter and his incidental damages. 
25 Value to the promiscc, not to the plaintiff, is relevant in cases where plaintiff 
is an assignee. No Michigan case raises this point or the related problem that arises 
if plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary. 
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between what defendant promised to do and what he in fact 
actually did in the way of performance. The "subtrahend" is al-
ways the value to plaintiff of being relieved by defendant's breach 
from all or part26 of plaintiff's scheduled performance.27 "Inci-
dental damages" are always the value to plaintiff of the expenses 
and/or losses he reasonably incurred after notice of breach in his 
attempts to mitigate damages.28 
This single general rule answers the questions of what is to be 
valued and how shall the value, once computed, be taken into 
account. Its universality, of course, is possible only because it 
ignores questions of valuation technique and burden of proof. 
The answers it gives to the two other questions are identical to 
those of the parochial formulae. If the parochial formulae are 
stripped of their references to valuation technique, they all turn 
out to be elliptical statements of this single general rule. 
26 In a "total breach" case plaintiff is relieved of all his remaining scheduled or 
promised performance. Of course, if plaintiff has fully performed, he is relieved of 
nothing. Where the breach relieves plaintiff only of part of his remaining scheduled 
or promised performance, courts often speak of the breach as partial or of the contract 
as divisible. 
27 No adjustment need be made, of course, if plaintiff fully performed his side of 
the contract before defendant's breach. Or, if the contract did not contemplate any 
return performance by plaintiff, and was enforceable because of some substitute for 
present consideration, such as formalism, past consideration, or action in reliance. Or, 
if the contract contemplated an aleatory return performance by plaintiff, and the 
aleatory condition qualifying plaintiff's duty to perform was neither met nor excused. 
But if a return performance by plaintiff was contemplated, and it was neither rendered 
nor excused for non-fulfillment of an aleatory condition, in measuring expectation 
damages account must be taken of plaintiff's saved performance. 
If plaintiff is the promisee in a "unilateral contract"- one in which plaintiff does 
not promise to perform, but his full performance is a condition qualifying defendant's 
promise to perform-and has not fully performed at the time of defendant's breach, 
plaintiff's saved performance should be taken into account in measuring expectation 
damages. This is true because, although plaintiff's remaining performance was never 
promised, he could not fulfill his expectations of receiving defendant's performance 
without rendering all of his own. 
In this fact situation there is often a question of whether any contract has been 
formed. Compare RllsTATEMENT § 45, comment b (merely acting in justifiable reliance 
on an offer may in some cases serve as sufficient reason for treating the offer as irrev-
ocable), with Pastras v. Oberlin, 350 Mich. 183, 86 N.W.2d 264 (1957) (defendant• 
owner-offeror can revoke non-exclusive realty listing arrangement prior to the time 
that plaintiff-broker-offeree found a buyer even though plaintiff has incurred detriment 
in justifiable reliance upon it). Assuming a unilateral contract to have been formed in 
this fact situation, there may still be a question whether plaintiff should get reliance, 
rather than expectation damages. See Savage 8e Farnum v. Drs. K. 8e K.'s U.S. Medical 
8e Surgical Ass'n, 59 Mich. 400, 26 N.W. 652 (1886) (court assumed that reliance damages 
are appropriate). 
28 The term is conventionally used in this sense, but not defined in this manner. 
E.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-710: "Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller 
include any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in 
stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's 
breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from 
the breach." 
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B. Consistency With Conventional Parochial Rules 
Parochial measurement formulae are almost always expressed 
elliptically. For example, the Uniform Sales Act rule quoted earlier 
says the measure of damages in a certain situation is "the differ-
ence between the contract price and the market or current price." 
It does not state expressly that it really means "the unpaid balance 
of the contract price," and not "the contract price."29 The omis-
sion has no significance in a case where none of the price has been 
paid at the time of breach, but the omission becomes important 
if defendant-buyer has prepaid all or part of the price. However, 
in cases where the latter problem is presented courts universally 
include in the formula an adjustment to reflect that part of the 
price that was paid.30 The parochial formulae typically omit refer-
ence to items which, although deserving attention when they arise, 
occur only infrequently. Thus the builder's formula, quoted ear-
lier,31 makes no reference to the value of materials which the 
builder has bought to perform the contract and which are still 
on hand when breach stops further performance. However, when 
such items are present in a builder case, they are taken into ac-
count, his recovery being reduced by the net resale value of such 
materials.32 
The elliptical nature of these rules tends to conceal the fact 
that they can all be framed into the same three-term formula-as 
minuend, subtrahend, and incidental damages. Demonstration 
with two familiar plaintiff-seller formulae will illustrate this. 
In cases where plaintiff is a sawmill operator, or some other 
non-employee seller of services, and defendant-buyer of services 
repudiated the contract before plaintiff had finished his work, 
courts often express the parochial formula as "lost profit plus costs 
incurred." The notion of "lost profit" in this context really means 
"contract price minus total costs," so the fuller expression would 
20 The Uniform Commercial Code is more precise. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE 
§ 2-708: " •.• the difference between the market price ..• and the unpaid contract 
price together with any incidental damages." 
30 See, e.g., Bradford Novelty Co. v. Technomatic, Inc., 142 Conn. 166, 112 A.2d 214 
(1955); Kolton v. Nassar, 358 Mich. 154, 99 N.W.2d 362 (1959); Hamilton v. Stephens, 
240 Mich. 228, 215 N.W. 321 (1927); Weils v. Board of Educ., 78 Mich. 260, 44 N.W. 
267 (1889); Sal's Furniture Co. v. Peterson, 86 R.I. 203, 133 A.2d 770 (1957). 
31 REsrATEMENT § 346(2)(a): " •.• the entire contract price and compensation for 
unavoidable special harm that the defendant had reason to foresee when the contract 
was made, less installments already paid and the cost of completion that the builder 
can reasonably save by not completing the work." 
32 See Moline Furniture Works v. Club Holding Co., 280 Mich. 587, 274 N.W. 338 
(1937); Detroit Fireproofing Tile Co. v. Vinton Co., 190 Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916); 
Weils v. Board of Educ., 78 Mich. 260, 44 N.W. 267 (1889). 
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be "(contract price minus total costs) plus costs incurred." Since 
"total costs" are the sum of costs incurred and costs yet to be in-
curred at the time of breach, the item of "costs incurred" appears 
twice in the formula if it is further amplified: "contract price 
minus (costs incurred plus costs yet to be incurred) plus costs in-
curred." Algebraic cancellation permits a simpler statement: "con-
tract price minus costs yet to be incurred."33 
But this version of "contract price minus costs yet to be in-
curred," while avoiding redundancy, is still elliptical. No court 
using the formula would hesitate to add to plaintiff's recovery an 
item unmentioned in the formula-plaintiff's "incidental ex-
penses" incurred in post-breach efforts to mitigate damages.34 Nor 
would such a court hesitate to reduce plaintiff's recovery to reflect 
still other phenomena as yet unmentioned in the formula. If at 
the time of notice of breach plaintiff has on hand either property 
-0r the right to command services, and he acquired such property 
or such right to services through expenditure which was included 
in "costs incurred," the value to plaintiff of such left-over services 
and property must be deducted from his recovery to avoid over-
compensation.35 
One fin<ll adjustment must be made, and is made by all courts 
using this formula: plaintiff's recovery is reduced to the extent 
that defendant has paid part of the contract price before trial. 36 
Thus, fully stated, this formula is "contract price plus inci-
dental expenses minus (costs yet to be incurred plus property on 
hand plus services on hand) minus that part of the price that has 
been paid." More succinctly it is "unpaid balance of the contract 
price minus (costs yet to be incurred plus property on hand plus 
services on hand) plus incidental expenses." 
This formula is identical to the author's "(minuend minus sub-
trahend) plus incidental expenses." "Unpaid balance of the con-
tract price" is the same as the author's "minuend"; "costs yet to 
be incurred plus property on hand plus services on hand" is iden-
33 The use of the parochial formula often leads to the wasted motion of proof of 
total costs and proof of costs incurred, rather than direct proof of costs yet to be in-
curred. However, plaintiff often wants proof of costs incurred in the record in case his 
expectation damage fails, and he must fall back to another remedy based on these costs. 
34 E.g., Shapiro v. Fyrac Mfg. Co., 264 Mich. 280, 249 N.W. 851 (1933); Piowaty v. 
Sheldon, 167 Mich. 218, 132 N.W. 517 (1911); Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 
N.W. 88 (1888). 
35 See cases cited in note 32 supra. See also Annot., 50 A.L.R. 1397 (1927). 
36 See Greenwood v. Davis, 106 Mich. 230, 64 N.W. 26 (1895); Atkinson v. Morse, 
63 Mich. 276, 29 N.W. 711 (1886); Goodrich v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 62, 16 N.W. 232 (1883). 
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tical to the author's "subtrahend"; and both rules allow recovery 
of incidental expenses.37 
Another familiar parochial rule is the "difference money" 
formula used where plaintiff is a seller of goods or realty which 
defendant-buyer refuses to accept: plaintiff recovers the differ-
ence between the contract price and the market price at the time 
and place of promised delivery.38 As indicated earlier, the term 
"contract price" in this formula really means "unpaid balance of 
the contract price."39 And, although the rule is silent as to this, 
plaintiff can recover his incidental damages as well as the recovery 
expressly indicated.40 Thus, with the gaps filled, the difference 
money formula reads: ",unpaid balance of the contract price less 
market price at the time and place of promised delivery plus in-
cidental damages." This formula, now expressed in three terms, is 
identical to the single general rule. "Unpaid balance of the con-
tract price" is identical to "minuend"; "market price at the time 
and place of promised delivery" is identical to "subtrahend"; both 
formulae permit recovery of incidental damages. 
These two parochial formulae, when amplified, differ in only 
one respect-the way they value the subtrahend. The "lost profit" 
rule values the subtrahend by reference to plaintiff's saved costs, 
whereas the "difference money" rule values it by reference to the 
price the saved property would command in the resale market41 
at the time and place of breach. Both rules give identical answers 
to the questions of what is to be valued, and, once valued, how it 
should be taken into account. 
The two illustrations may suffice to show that the single gen-
eral rule is identical with all parochial measurement formulae 
which are concerned with expectation damages. There are some 
parochial formulae, however, which are concerned with measuring 
37 For a full treatment of the various ways in which the builder's parochial rule 
is stated, see Patterson, Builder's .Measure of Recovery for Breach of Contract, 31 CoLuM. 
L. REV. 1286 (1931). Cf. R:£s'I'ATEMENT § 333, comments a, c. 
38 See Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255, 200 N.W. 252 (1924); Pandaleon v. 
Bretl.er, 227 Mich. 297, 198 N.W. 953 (1924); Peters v. Cooper, 95 Mich. 191, 54 N.W. 
694 (1893); Simons v. Ypsilanti Paper Co., 77 Mich. 185, 43 N.W. 864 (1889). See 
generally Annots., 108 A.L.R. 1482 (1937); 44 A.L.R. 215 (1926). 
39 See te.xt at note 29 supra. 
40 See Piowaty v. Sheldon, 167 Mich. 218, 132 N.W. 517 (1911); Peters v. Cooper, 
95 Mich. 191, 54 N.W. 694 (1893); Simons v. Ypsilanti Paper Co., 77 Mich. 185, 43 N.W. 
864 (1889); Annot., 29 A.L.R. 61 (1924). . 
41 Although the rule docs not specify the "market" in question, it refers to the 
market in which plaintiff-seller would resell. See Mohr Hardware Co. v. Dubey, 136 
Mich. 677, 100 N.W. 127 (1904); Peters v. Cooper, supra note 40; Simons v. Ypsilanti 
Paper Co., supra note 40. But cf. Balcom v. Tribbett, 197 Mich. 620, 164 N.W. 261 (1917). 
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plaintiff's recovery under some other remedy, and these rules, of 
course, cannot be stated in terms of minuend, subtrahend, and in-
cidental damages. For example, in Michigan42 and many other 
states,43 plaintiff cannot cover expectation damages where defend-
ant, a vendor of land, is guilty of a "good faith" breach of his 
promise to deliver marketable title to the land. Instead, if plain-
tiff seeks damages, he gets a smaller recovery. Parochial formulae 
governing this situation are not equivalent to the single general 
rule. Loose judicial language, referring to all remedies which result 
in a judgment for a sum of money as "damages," sometimes blurs 
the distinctions among these various contract remedies: the price, 
expectation damages, reliance damages, money restitution, fore-
closure and sale with deficiency judgment, statutory remedies, 
seller's specific performance remedy, and the peculiar measure, 
already described, used for vendor's "good faith" failure to pro-
duce marketable title. The single general rule is only the equiva-
lent of those parochial rules which aim at giving expectation 
damages. 
II. VALUING THE SUBTRAHEND: GENERAL 
A. Scope of This Article 
The single general rule leaves unanswered questions of valua-
tion technique and burden of proof; other rules are needed to 
handle them. These valuation and burden of proof rules neces-
sarily must be numerous, albeit not as numerous as the paro-
chial formulae they are designed to replace. For convenience, 
attention in these articles is limited to the valuation and proof 
burden problems of only one of the three terms-the subtrahend. 
More accurately, this article should be entitled "Valuing the 
Subtrahend in Michigan."44 The present title was adopted to 
delude some readers into thinking the article was going to prove 
comprehensible. Actually, cases in which the subtrahend proves 
hard to value are always cases in which plaintiff is a "seller"-one 
whose performance is not merely payment of a sum of money. 
Where plaintiff is merely to pay money, there is little difficulty 
with the subtrahend; in those (plaintiff-buyer) cases it is normally 
42 Hamburger v. Berman, 203 Mich. 78, 83-84, 168 N.W. 925, 926-27 (1918); Hammond 
v. Hannin, 21 Mich. 374 (1870). But cf. Way v. Root, 174 Mich. 418, 428-29, 140 N.W. 
577, 580-81 (1913) (court refused to say if Hammond is still good law in Michigan). 
43 5 CORBIN §§ 1097, 1098; McCORMICK§ 178; Annots., 68 A.L.R. 137 (1930); 48 A.L.R. 
12 (1927). 
44 Or, "So You're Going To Value a Michigan Subtrahend." 
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the minuend that proves sticky.45 To the extent that Michigan 
plaintiff-seller cases have presented problems of minuend valua-
tion, the problems are discussed, but for the most part the plaintiff-
seller cases prove troublesome only as regards the subtrahend. 
B. Policies Governing Valuation of the Subtrahend 
Earlier it was suggested that conventional doctrine does not 
approach damage measurement in terms of valuation, and that 
parochial rules give only fragmentary guidance when a choice of 
valuation methods must be made. But the abstract policies which 
guide damage measurement set the goals for choice of valuation 
technique, if the implications of these policies are pursued. One 
guiding principle of valuation is that, subject to one qualification, 
the value sought is the value to plaintiff. This accords with the 
idea that plaintiff should recover a sum which, when added to the 
benefits he already received under the contract, will give him an 
economic status identical to the one he would have enjoyed had 
the contract been performed precisely as agreed. 
The major qualification of this approach flows from the miti-
gation notion-that there is no recovery for those consequences 
of breach which plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable self-
protective care. Thus, the value of the subtrahend can never be 
lower than the value that would have been realized by a reason-
able man in plaintiff's post-breach plight. 
Since another of these abstract policies dictates that gains flow-
ing from breach must be taken into account whether or not the 
mitigation requirement obligated plaintiff to incur the risk or 
hardship entailed in making such gains, the value of the sub-
trahend can sometimes exceed the value it would have had for a 
reasonable man in plaintiff's post-breach predicament-in those 
cases where plaintiff takes risks or incurs hardship not required 
by the mitigation rule and thus enhances the value of the subtra-
hend. Putting together these notions, the value of the subtrahend 
will always be the higher of these two figures: (1) value computed 
by reference to what plaintiff actually did after breach; and (2) 
value computed by reference to what a reasonable man would have 
done in plaintiff's post-breach plight to satisfy mitigation require-
ments. 
For example, if breach releases the time of plaintiff, a full-time 
employee of defendant, that would have been devoted to defend-
45 It is rare that incidental damages are hard to value. 
860 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
ant's work, mitigation notions dictate that the value of the saved 
time be no less than the price it would have brought had plaintiff 
made reasonable efforts to find re-employment in the same general 
line of work in the same general locale.46 However, if after breach 
plaintiff actually finds re-employment in some other line of work 
which is more hazardous, but more remunerative, his receipts 
from that work fix the value of his saved time.47 
C. Policies Governing Burden of Proof 
The abstract policies governing all expectation damage meas-
urement furnish no help in allocating the burden of proof. Nor 
is there any other well-established body of doctrine concerned 
with the burden of proving various aspects of the subtrahend. 
Since choice of valuation technique is closely bound to burden of 
proof, it seems necessary to set forth my own assumptions about 
the policies to be consulted in allotting the burden before treat-
ing specific problems. The Michigan case law contains nothing 
in the way of policy statements on this point except the familiar 
idea that the burden should fall on the party who normally has 
superior access to the evidence needed to carry it,48 but there is 
no discussion of the impact on this idea of Michigan's later adop-
tion of broad pre-trial discovery rules.49 At least in cases where 
the sum at stake justifies the time and expense of extensive dis-
covery, the new procedure tends to equalize the parties' access to 
evidence. Nor is there any discussion in the Michigan plaintiff-
seller cases of competing goals that bear on the question of who 
should bear the risk of a directed verdict in a no-proof situation. 
(1) It is better to give the burden to the party with superior 
access to the evidence needed to sustain it. 
(2) Where the issue is susceptible to a yes-or-no answer,60 and 
neither party can carry the burden, it is better to place the burden 
46 See Wood v. Ravenscroft, 135 Iowa 346, 112 N.W. 640 (1907); Hussey v. Holloway, 
217 Mass. 100, 104 N.E. 471 (1914); Edgecomb v. School Dist., 341 Mich. 106, 67 N.W.2d 
87 (1954); Gallina v. Boland, 221 Mich. 502, 191 N.W. 222 (1922); Farrell v. School Dist., 
98 Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053 (1893); Annots., 81 A.L.R. 282 (1932); 72 A.L.R. 1049 (1931); 
28 A.L.R. 736 (1924). 
47 See Callender v. Myers Regulator Co., 250 Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930), and 
cases cited in note 10 supra. 
48 E.g., Mount Ida School for Girls v. Rood, 253 Mich. 482, 235 N.W. 227 (1931); 
International Textbook Co. v. Schulte, 151 Mich. 149, 114 N.W. 1031 (1908). 
49 The Michigan cases stressing relative access to the evidence were decided in 1931 
and 1908. Broad discovery rules were adopted in 1952 and 1958. See MICH. CT. R. 35. 
See also Comment, 8 WAYNE L. REv. 417 (1962). 
50 Such as the question: could plaintiff have handled another similar contract 
simultaneously? Questions of dollar value are not susceptible to a yes-or-no answer. 
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on the party who is maintaining the less likely state of facts, so 
that the court's assumption about the facts will coincide with the 
probable state of affairs. 
(3) Where neither party can carry the burden, and the conse-
quences of failing to carry it are less severe if it is placed on one of 
them, it is better to place it on that party. 
( 4) Where neither party can carry the burden, it is better to 
place it on plaintiff (with resulting undercompensation and split-
ting of the loss). 
Some of these notions require amplification. Where the issue is 
the existence or value of an item which is added to the subtrahend, 
the consequences are more severe if plaintiff has the burden of 
proof, where plaintiff has no other remedy than damages to vin-
dicate his expectation interest. If plaintiff fails to carry the burden 
on such an item, he is deprived of all expectation damages. It is 
necessary to visit him with so Draconian a penalty in order to get 
him to establish items which, once established, reduce his recovery. 
On the other hand, if defendant has the burden of proving such 
items, it suffices to value at zero such items as defendant fails to 
establish, leaving the rest of the expectation damage issues un-
affected. This analysis supports giving defendant the burden of 
proving the existence and value of items which go to enhance the 
subtrahend. 
But if plaintiff has an alternative way to vindicate his expecta-
tion interest, such as a suit for the price or specific performance, 
that interest is not as seriously harmed by plaintiff's being deprived 
of expectation damages. Moreover, if defendant has the burden of 
proof on some item of expectation damages which cannot be proved, 
plaintiff will be tempted to elect his damage remedy in the hope 
of being overcompensated when defendant fails to carry the bur-
den. Thus, where plaintiff has an alternative remedy, the burden 
should be cast on him. 
Where at issue is an item which, when established, reduces 
the subtrahend, defendant must be visited with a fairly severe 
penalty to force him to prove an item which augments plaintiff's 
recovery. This can be done only by valuing the subtrahend at 
zero if defendant fails to prove that item. If plaintiff has the bur-
den on such an item, it suffices to value it at zero if the burden is 
not carried. 
Where neither party can carry the burden if imposed, the 
court's choice involves either too much or too little recovery for 
plaintiff. "Too much" means that he recovers more than can be 
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justified in terms of all major relevant policy considerations; "too 
little" means that he recovers less than he should get to take into 
account all of these important policy factors. In the prior article I 
argued for giving defendant the burden of proof because in close 
cases this would enhance plaintiff's recovery, this being desirable 
because contract damage measurement always tends to give plain-
tiff too little. 51 This allocation of the burden, I urged, would serve 
to reverse this tendency, whereas the opposite allocation would ag-
gravate it. 
I envisioned this tendency to give too little as flowing from 
three doctrines: the "certainty" requirement, the non-recovery 
of expenses of litigation, and the notion that recovery is limited 
to harm to plaintiff's economic interests.52 My (erroneous) tacit 
assumption was that these three doctrines were arbitrary limita-
tions, reflecting no valid social policy. Upon reflection, however, 
I conclude that the doctrines do have a basis in social policy,°3 and 
that a recovery reduced in order to reflect them is not too small, 
but rather is of the correct size to reflect all related major social 
policies. 
Thus, allocation of the burden of proof forces a choice be-
tween giving too much and giving too little; it is not relevant to 
argue, as I did earlier, that it is better to give the right amount 
than too little.54 Stressing only the evils of undercompensation (it 
fails to deter breach adequately;55 it fails to make promises suffi-
ciently reliable;56 it fails to satisfy the notion imbedded in the 
mores that the breaching party should fulfill, by damages, if not 
performance, the expectations of plaintiff57) is misleading; over-
compensation has its complementary evils. 
51 Harris, A General Theory for Measuring Seller's Damages for Total Breach of 
Contract, 60 MICH. L. REv. 577, 589-90 (1962). 
52 Ibid. 
53 The "certainty" requirement is an aspect of burden of proof allocation and reflects 
all the policies that relate to that allocation. For a policy discussion of the non-recovery 
of litigation expenses, see 5 CORBIN § 1037; McCORMICK § 71; Note, 21 VA. L. REv. 920 
(1935); Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 699 (1940). For a policy discussion of non-recovery for 
non-economic harms, see 5 CORBIN § 1076; McCORMICK § 145. 
54 Harris, supra note 51, at 589-90. 
55 See KEssLER &: SHARP, CASES ON CoNTRAcrs 555 (1953); Fuller &: Perdue, The 
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 61 (1936); Comment, 57 YALE 
L.J. 1360, 1366 (1948). 
56 See Fuller &: Perdue, supra note 55, at 72; Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An 
Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 725 n.47 (1931). 
57 I am somewhat puzzled to state the policy basis of the notion that plaintiff should 
recover enough to fulfill the expectations defendant created. Perhaps the mores dictate 
that fairness between plaintiff and defendant requires this measure, and the social policy 
is the familiar one of adjudicating quarrels in the light of norms hallowed by custom. 
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The imposition of overcompensatory liability is more likely 
to dislocate or ruin an existing enterprise than the imposition of 
compensatory liability. And the notion appears to be established 
in the mores that the breaching party should not be required to 
pay his victim a sum larger than that required to make the victim 
whole;58 overcompensation does violence to this concept of man-
ta-man justice. 
Sometimes fallacious arguments are put forward to show social 
utility in awarding plaintiff more money than is necessary to re-
store him to the status he would have enjoyed but for breach. The 
argument that plaintiff should be given enough money to punish 
the morally delinquent defendant ( even if this is more than needed 
to compensate plaintiff)5° suffers from two flaws: first, contract 
liability is by and large amoral, treating the innocent breacher in 
the same way as the malicious one; 60 second, under modern forms 
of business enterprise liability is usually vicarious, presenting the 
likelihood that innocent principals will pay the judgment flowing 
from a contract breach by their less innocent agent. The argument 
that overcompensation has a salutary effect in making promises 
more reliable in the future61 probably overestimates the impact 
on future commercial behavior of the isolated overcompensatory 
case, which (even if counsel knew of it and the client's decisions 
were all based on advice of counsel) could be nullified by the astute 
drafting of later contracts. 
If, as I now suspect, allocation of the burden requires a judicial 
choice between giving plaintiff what, in the light of all major 
policy considerations, is too much or too little money, the choice 
Perhaps the judges sincerely believe that there arc mores which so dictate, albeit the 
"mores" arc in fact nonexistent. Perhaps the judges, seeking a place to draw the line 
between competing social goals of give-enough-to-deter-breach and don't-givc-so-much-you-
detcr-contracting, found this line handy. See Fuller &: Perdue, supra note 55, at 57-66. 
58 It is surprisingly hard to document this statement by quotations or citations. 
American judges and text writers seem to assume a priori that ovcrcompensatory awards 
for breach of contract are bad; they do not trouble themselves to identify the social 
evils that might flow from such awards. The practical corollaries of this assumption 
include the judicial refusal to honor agreements for the award of overcompensatory 
("punitive") damages in the event of future breach; judicial refusal to permit recovery 
of punitive damages for breach of contract even in those instances where the breach 
was attended by patent moral culpability; and extreme judicial reluctance to permit 
back-door recovery of punitive damages in the guise of compensation to redress plain-
tiff's interest in being free from "mental anguish." 
rm See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Knights of Maccabees, 100 Mich. 40, 58 N.W. 640 (1894); 
Rl:srATEMENT § 331, comment c; Editorial, 66 CENT. L.J. 365, 366 (1908). 
60 Except insofar as doctrines of mistake and impossibility and judge or jury "fudging" 
in the interpretive and fact-finding process enter the picture, liability is imposed without 
regard to the moral nature of the breach. 
61 Harris, supra note 51, at 589. 
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should be made by reference to a minor social policy-one which 
otherwise would not be consulted. 
The "minor" policy in question is a social preference for pres-
ervation of existing enterprises from destruction or serious disloca-
tion as the result of the imposition of civil liability. Undercompen-
sation leaves part of the loss where it originally fell, on plaintiff's 
enterprise, and shifts part of it to defendant's enterprise. Thus, 
each enterprise need absorb and/or redistribute only part of the 
loss. Presumably, there is less likelihood of ruin or dislocation 
when two enterprises each bear part of a loss than when one enter-
prise bears all of it. Overcompensation not only shifts to defend-
ant all of the loss plaintiff sustained, but sometimes results in 
additional liability, as well. In some cases, at least, overcompensa-
tion achieves ruin of defendant's enterprise whereas undercom-
pensation would not have visited ruin on either enterprise.132 
This social antipathy toward ruinous civil liability is probably 
consulted in this context (where major social goals are at a stand-
off), even if it is not well enough established to be deemed deter-
minative in other contexts where better-established policies are not 
in equipoise. 63 
These various notions regarding allocation of the burden often 
pull in different directions in a given case. By and large, it would 
seem wise to subordinate the notion of placing the burden on 
the party with better access to the evidence to the other policies 
where: (a) the issue is one which often cannot be proved by either 
party, and (b) broad discovery rules tend to equalize accessibility 
to evidence. And it would seem wise to treat the undercompensa-
tion policy as paramount where there is a conflict among the pol-
icies to be applied on an issue which often is not susceptible of 
proof by either party, and the allocation of the burden on this 
issue will have a major impact on the size of the award. Thus, on 
many major issues the controlling consideration is the preference 
for undercompensation, leading to the burden of proof being 
placed on plaintiff. 
However, to avoid unduly undercompensating plaintiff, courts 
should temper the rigors of the burden allocated in this fashion by 
fairly relaxed standards as to how "certain" evidence must be to 
carry the burden effectively.64 Some requirement of "certainty" or 
<>2 Id. at 589 n.54. 
63 E.g., id. at 590. 
64 Cf. R.EsrATEMENT § 329, comment e: "The uncertainties of valuation are frequently 
so great that all that can be hoped for is an honest and reasonably intelligent estimation, 
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"sufficiency" must be imposed, or the burden becomes meaning-
less. But the requirement should be no more onerous than neces-
sary to reduce the risks of substantial overcompensation. 
Since 1895 the Michigan Supreme Court has handled the over-
compensation-burden of proof problem in plaintiff-seller contract 
cases as suggested here. It has generally given plaintiff the burden 
on major issues, but eased his path by a fairly tolerant view as 
regards the sufficiency of his evidence to carry the burden. Prior to 
1895 the burden was imposed in the same way, but there were 
wide swings of opinion concerning the amount of "certainty" that 
plaintiff's evidence must demonstrate. Cases involving "lost profits" 
created the battleground. 
Prior to 1895 the history of the court's treatment of lost profits 
divides into two epochs. The first, roughly from 1859 to 1882, was 
dominated by the views of Justice Christiancy. Although he had 
retired from the court prior to Hopkins v. Sanford65 (1879), his 
attitudes were reflected in that decision. The second period, 
roughly from 1882 to 1895, was dominated by the attitudes of 
Justice Cooley. Although he had left the court prior to Hutchinson 
Mfg. Co. v. Pinch66 (1892), his prior opinions left their mark on 
that case. 
Justice Christiancy had favored the recovery of lost profits in 
tort suits67 and in contract actions where the plaintiff-seller sought 
to use the formula "lost profits plus costs incurred."68 He saw the 
recovery of lost profits as desirable to achieve full compensation 
of plaintiffs and to deter future breach. 69 Although he never 
espoused allocating the burden of proof to defendant, he did favor 
a vast relaxation of the notion of "certainty," preferring to run 
the risk that plaintiff be overcompensated rather than the oppo-
site.70 
The measurement of an injury in money by a jury or by the trial court will not readily 
be set aside in cases where the subject-matter is complex and exchange values are doubt-
ful or difficult." See also Annot., 78 A.L.R. 858 (1932). 
65 41 Mich. 243, 2 N.W. 39 (1879). 
66 91 Mich. 156, 51 N.W. 930 (1892). 
67 See Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117 (1871); Alliscm v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542 
(1863) (trespass). 
os See Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich. 239 (1872); Burrell v. New York &: Saginaw Solar 
Salt Co., 14 Mich. 34 (1865) (opinion of Cooley, J.; Christiancy, J., concurring); Hosmer 
v. Wilson, 7 Mich. 293 (1859). He conceded the validity of a relaxed "certainty" rule 
in cases where plaintiff-buyer sought lost collateral profits. Edwards v. Sanborn, 6 Mich. 
347 (1859). 
69 See Hosmer v. 'Wilson, supra note 68, and the other cases cited in note 68 supra. 
70 Ibid. 
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After 188!71 Justice Cooley led a somewhat indiscriminate re-
action against this tolerance of lost profit recovery. Perhaps his 
motive lay in a fear that, in cases where liability is imposed without 
fault, defendant might be saddled with ruinous liability to redress 
plaintiff's broken expectations.72 In two kinds of cases there was 
a real peril of this phenomenon: tort suits, and the contract suits 
in which plaintiff-buyer sought the "collateral" profits on some 
larger transaction which aborted upon defendant's breach. In the 
cases of present concern to us-where the plaintiff-seller sought 
lost "direct" profits-there was no peril of vast liability: the direct 
profits can never exceed the contract price. Justice Cooley ap-
parently failed to appreciate the distinction, however, and he 
transformed the "foreseeability" and "certainty" requirements 
into insuperable obstacles to lost profit recovery in all three types 
of cases.73 
In Allis v. McLean,74 in 1882, Justice Cooley's abhorrence of 
lost profit recovery first reached a plaintiff-seller case. The court 
held that the plaintiff sawmill operator could not recover lost 
profits, nor could he recover the rental value of his mill while 
it lay idle. Indeed, the court went on to say that, regardless of the 
evidence presented, no sawmill operator could ever recover lost 
profits, because profits were "proverbially uncertain" in that trade. 
This blanket proscription of lost profit recovery by an entire in-
dustry was later extended to flour millers, 75 the language in Allis 
having suggested that "millers," rather than "sawmillers," were 
covered. 
But almost as soon as Allis was decided, the retreat from it 
began. Throughout the period from 1882 to 1895, when only one 
71 Until then Justice Cooley had acquiesced in cases where lost profits were recovered. 
E.g., Hopkins v. Sanford, 41 Mich. 243, 2 N.W. 39 (1879); Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich. 
239 (1872); Sisson v. Cleveland 8: T.R.R., 14 Mich. 489 (1866); Burrell v. New York 8: 
Saginaw Solar Salt Co., 14 Mich. 34 (1865). Justice Christiancy had left the bench before 
Justice Cooley's new attitude was expressed. 
72 That he was upset at large recoveries when defendant was without fault is 
suggested by his remarks in Talcott v. Crippen, 52 Mich 633, 635-36, 18 N.W. 392, 393 
(1884), denying recovery for lost profits in a tort suit because they were unforeseeable, 
See also Hammond v. Hannin, 21 Mich. 374 (1870) (no expectation damages recoverable 
for "good faith" breach of land contract by vendor). Cf. '\\Tetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 
311 (1871) (measure for conversion where lumber has been made into hoops). 
73 Talcott v. Crippen, supra note 72 (replevin for lost profits); Allis v. McLean, 48 
Mich. 428, 12 N.W. 640 (1882) (plaintiff-seller seeking direct profits); McKinnon .v. 
McEwan, 48 Mich. 106, 11 N.W. 828 (1882); Friedland v. McNeil, 33 Mich. 40 (1875) 
(plaintiff-buyer seeking lost collateral profits). 
74 48 Mich. 428, 12 N.W. 640 (1882). 
75 Hutchinson Mfg. Co. v. Pinch, 91 Mich. 156, 51 N.W. 930 (1892) (flour millers 
cannot recover lost profits but can recover rental value of idle mill). 
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miller was permitted to use a "lost profit" formula,76 plaintiff-
sellers from all other trades were allowed to use such a measure 
without hindrance.77 And during the thirteen years until Allis 
was repudiated in Fell v. Newberry78 in 1895, the court conducted 
a step-by-step retreat in the cases involving millers.79 By the time 
of the Fell decision Justice Cooley was gone from the bench, 
millers were out from under the cloud, and the "certainty" require-
ment in plaintiff-seller cases had taken its modern, relaxed form.80 
Apparently Allis was recognized as a mistake almost as soon as it 
was decided, although an express distinction between contract 
suits for "direct" profits (the plaintiff-seller cases), and contract 
suits for "collateral" profits (the plaintiff-buyer cases) was not 
uttered until in Fell.81 Henceforth such lingering hostility to lost 
profit recovery as survived Justice Cooley was confined to the tort 
and collateral profit suits.82 In time, the relaxed "certainty" re-
quirement spread to all contract actions.83 
76 E.g., Petric v. Lane, 58 Mich. 527, 25 N.W. 504 (1885) (sawmill's recovery of lost 
profits reversed for exclusion of evidence that no profits were lost); Petrie v. Lane, 67 
Mich. 454-, 35 N.W. 70 (1887) (directed verdict against sawmill seeking lost profits 
affirmed); Maltby v. Plummer, 71 Mich. 578, 40 N.W. 3 (1888) (sawmill failed to prove 
lost profits with certainty); Hutchinson Mfg. Co. v. Pinch, supra note 75 (flour millers 
cannot recover lost profits). In Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 (1888), 
the trial judge directed verdict against the sawmill after plaintiff's opening statement, 
and was reversed. But the court held only that the case should not be decided at that 
stage; plaintiff had yet to submit his evidence to establish lost profits. 
77 Goodrich v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 62, 16 N.W. 232 (1883) (haulfr of timber); Rayburn 
v. Comstock, 80 Mich. 448, 45 N.W. 378 (1890) (logger); Mueller v. Bethesda Mineral 
Spring Co., 88 Mich. 390, 50 N.W. 319 (1891) (franchised distributor of bottled water); 
Scheible v. Klein, 89 Mich. 376, 50 N.W. 857 (1891) (building contractor); Lee v. Briggs, 
99 Mich. 487, 58 N.W. 477 (1894) (logger); Hitchcock v. Knights of Maccabees, 100 Mich. 
40, 58 N.W. 640 (1894) (organizer of fraternal lodges). 
78 106 Mich. 542, 543-44, 64 N.W. 474, 474-75 (1895). 
70 Allis v. McLean, 48 Mich. 428, 12 N.W. 640 (1882) (no sawmill operator can recover 
anything as plaintiff-seller regardless of his evidence); Petrie v. Lane, 58 Mich. 527, 25 
N.W. 504 (1885) (sawmill operator's recovery of lost profits reversed for uncertainty and 
exclusion of evidence); Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 (1888) (trial judge 
erred in directing verdict against sawmill operator after his opening statement seeking 
lost profits); Maltby v. Plummer, 71 Mich. 578, 40 N.W. 3 (1888) (sawmill operator's lost 
profits arc too speculative, but he can recover wages paid idle permanent employees); 
Hutchinson Mfg. Co. v. Pinch, 91 Mich. 156, 51 N.W. 930 (1892) (flour miller's lost 
profits too speculative, but he can recover rental value of idle mill, own lost time, and 
wages paid permanent employees); Fell v. Newberry, 106 Mich. 542, 64 N.W. 474 (1895) 
(sawmill operator's recovery of lost profits permitted; court overruled Talcott case, which 
quotes Allis, sub silentio overruling Allis). 
80 E.g., Herron v. Raupp, 156 Mich. 162, 120 N.W. 584 (1909); Barrett v. Graud 
Rapids Veneer Works, 110 Mich. 6, 67 N.W. 976 (1896). 
81 Fell v. Newberry, 106 Mich. 542, 543, 64 N.W. 474 (1895) ('profits .•• made in the 
general conduct of the business"). (Emphasis added.) 
82 E.g., Truman v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 169 Mich. 153, 135 N.W. 89 (1912), 
and Quay v. Duluth, So. Shore & Atl. Ry., 153 Mich. 567, 116 N.W. 1101 (1908) ("certainty" 
defeats tort suit for lost profits). 
83 E.g., Scrbinoff v. Dukas, 348 Mich. 69, 81 N.W.2d 236 (1957); United States Gypsum 
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Apart from the woes of millers during the period 1882-1895, 
the "certainty" requirement has proved troublesome to plaintiff-
sellers in only one other situation: where the quantity term of the 
contract is not fixed numerically, but is defined in terms of the 
buyer's requirements. If breach occurs before the buyer establishes 
a pattern of annual or periodic requirements, and the contract is 
devoid of a fixed minimum requirement or liquidated damages 
clause, it may prove impossible to establish the quantity of goods 
the buyer would have taken, and subtrahend valuation fails for 
want of certainty (as does minuend valuation). In three cases the 
Michigan Supreme Court has found such uncertainty fatal,84 and 
in three similar cases slightly better proof has satisfied the "cer-
tainty" requirement.85 In none of these cases, however, does the 
"certainty" requirement appear to be a mask for judicial hostility 
to any recovery of large lost profits, as it was in the Cooley era. Nor 
has the "foreseeability" doctrine been used in that fashion in 
plaintiff-seller cases (although it, too, was put to that use in other 
kinds of cases in that era). • 
The laxity with which the court has viewed plaintiff's shaky 
evidence in some of these cases deserves emphasis. Evidence 
deemed sufficient to carry the burden of going forward has run 
the gamut from conclusory statements by the plaintiff,86 through 
expert testimony,87 to elaborate accounting exhibits conjured up 
from esoteric costing methods.88 Many of the witnesses permitted 
to express opinions were of questionable expertise89 and often the 
Co. v. Zacks, 236 Mich. 698, 211 N.W. 22 (1926); Ludwigsen v. Larsen, 227 Mich. 528, 198 
N.W. 900 (1924); Balcom v. Tribbett, 197 Mich. 620, 164 N.W. 261 (1917). 
84 Hall v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 325 Mich. 35, 37 N.W.2d 702 (1949) (salesman 
suing supplier); Isbell v. Anderson Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 136 N.W. 457 (1912) 
(franchised electric car dealer suing his supplier); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Corbit, 127 Mich. 
473, 86 N.W. 954 (1901) (manufacturet of grain drills suing his exclusive distributor). 
85 Holton v. Monarch Motor Car Co., 202 Mich. 271, 168 N.W. 539 (1918); Hitchcock 
v. Knights of Maccabees, 100 Mich. 40, 58 N.W. 640 (1894); Mueller v. Bethesda Mineral 
Spring Co., 88 Mich. 390, 50 N.W. 319 (1891). See generally Annots., 89 A.L.R. 252 (1934); 
52 A.L.R. 546 (1928); 32 A.L.R. 209 (1924). 
86 See, e.g., Record, pp. 61, 75, 78, Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co. v. Plywood 
Prods. Corp., 311 Mich. 226, 18 N.W.2d 387 (1945); Record, p. 8, Loud v. Campbell, 26 
Mich. 239 (1872). But see app. for Appellant, p. 4(a), Kolton v. Nassar, 358 Mich. 154, 99 
N.W.2d 362 (1959). 
87 See, e.g., Record, pp. 4-6, Hester v. Harley, 230 Mich. 432, 202 N.W. 966 (1925); 
Record, pp. 90, 99, 103, Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 222 Mich. 95, 192 N.W. 668 
(1923); Record, pp. 59, 78-79, Herron v. Raupp, 156 Mich. 162, 120 N.W. 584 (1909). 
ss See Nurmi v. Beardsley, 284 Mich. 165, 278 N.W. 805 (1938); Record, p. 44, Moline 
Furniture Works v. Club Holding Co., 280 Mich. 587, 274 N.W. 338 (1937); Record, 
exhibit 45, Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., supra note 87; Record, pp. 46-48, Har-
rington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 166 Mich. 276, 131 N.W. 559 (1911). 
so See Record, p. 49, Milligan v. Haggerty, 296 Mich. 62, 295 N.W. 560 (1941) (elderly 
1963] THE SELLER'S DAMAGES 869 
alleged accounting figures turned out to be no more than preten-
tious guesses. 90 
The extent of the imprecision which has been tolerated be-
comes even clearer upon examination of the way in which the 
trier of facts has been permitted to manipulate the figures pro-
duced. In one instance a trial judge was permitted to pull a 650 
dollar "fudge factor" out of the air to offset what he felt to be an 
exaggeration in plaintiff's testimony.91 In another case the jury 
was advised that, while they had no discretionary power to assess 
damages, they were not bound by the cost figures introduced by 
plaintiff. 92 In both cases there was no other evidence in the record 
on the issue. 
In a number of cases the problem has been by-passed by a 
stipulation as to the amount of damages,93 and in others plaintiff's 
success can be attributed in part to the lack of vigor on the part of 
defendant. In many instances defendant has offered no counter-
vailing proof on the damage issue, 94 and the verbal attacks on 
plaintiff's evidence often eschew specific criticism in favor of a 
parade of tired epithets-"speculative," "uncertain," "conjec-
tural."95 No doubt some of this apathy of defendants reflects a 
fatalistic appreciation of the trial judge's reluctance to reach the 
conclusion that a wrong should go without substantial remedy 
because it has deprived the plaintiff of the opportunity to measure 
lawyer who had once attended engineering school but never worked in the business); 
Record, pp. 59-60, Gulf Vegetable & Fruit Co. v. Lane, 258 Mich. 634, 242 N.W. 792 
(1932) (employee of trade publication whose sole connection with the market was in 
connection with the sale of the disputed goods). 
oo See Record, pp. 75, 130-31, Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co. v. Plywood Prods. 
Corp., 3ll Mich. 226, 18 N.W.2d 387 (1945); Petrie v. Lane, 67 Mich. 454, 456-58, 35 N.W. 
70, 71-72 (1887). 
91 See Record, pp. 131-32, Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co. v. Plywood Prods. Corp., 
supra note 90. 
02 See Record, p. 131, Federal Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Burstein, 222 Mich. 88, 192 
N.W. 549 (1923). See also Record, p. 166, Taylor v. Goldsmith, 228 Mich. 259, 200 N.W. 
254 (1924). 
93 See, e.g., United States Gypsum Co. v. Zacks, 236 Mich. 698, 211 N.W. 22 (1926). 
94 See, e.g., Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co. v. Plywood Prods. Corp., 311 Mich. 
226, 18 N.W.2d 387 (1945); Holton v. Monarch Motor Car Co., 202 Mich. 271, 168 N.W. 
539 (1918); Harrington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 166 Mich. 276, 131 N.W. 559 
(19ll); Atkinson v. Morse, 63 Mich. 276, 29 N.W. 711 (1886); Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich. 
239 (1872). But see Record, p. 51, Milligan v. Haggerty, 296 Mich. 62, 295 N.W. 560 
(1941); Record, pp. 94, 100, 11!1, Taylor v. Goldsmith, 228 Mich. 259, 200 N.W. 254 
(1924); Record, pp. 159-60, 165, 185, Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 222 Mich. 
95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923); Record, pp. 100, Ill, Herron v. Raupp, 156 Mich. 162, 120 N.W. 
584 (1909). 
95 See, e.g., Record, pp. 11, 60, Detroit Fireproofing Tile Co. v. Vinton Co., 190 
Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916); Record, p. 25, Atkinson v. Morse, supra note 94. 
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his loss with precision.96 Thus there may be at work, in trial courts 
at least, not only a preference for undercompensation rather than 
overcompensation, but also a preference for overcompensation 
rather than nominal damages. 
D. Valuation Terminology 
When a court concludes that plaintiff was permitted or re-
quired to abandon further efforts to complete and resell the per-
formance still unrendered when notified of defendant's breach, 
it should value the subtrahend by totalling the values of all the 
individual components that would have gone into plaintiff's post-
breach performance. This is "components" valuation of the sub-
trahend, or a "components approach." When a court concludes 
that plaintiff was permitted or required to complete and resell 
the performance still unrendered when notified of defendant's 
breach, it should value the subtrahend by reference to the resale 
value of that performance, viewing it as an entity. This is "entity" 
valuation of the subtrahend, or an "entity approach." The judicial 
decision as to whether plaintiff was permitted or required to take 
one post-breach course rather than the other amounts to a choice 
between "entity" and "components" valuation of the subtrahend. 
The nature of this choice can be illustrated by the plight of 
plaintiff in Leonard v. Beaudry,91 a sa\\TIIlill operator who con-
tracted to cut defendant's lumber into boards. Performance of this 
contract would have kept plaintiff's mill fully occupied during 
that year's milling season. Defendant's repudiation came shortly 
before plaintiff's performance was to begin. At that juncture plain-
tiff had a choice: to try to find other loggers to whom the mill's 
services could be sold, or to close down the mill for the season. 
The decision actually taken, to seek other customers, was a deci-
sion to resell the entity. In this instance the "entity" was the mil-
ling services of this mill for one season. 
The resale efforts were largely unsuccessful, plaintiff being 
unable to find any customers that late in the season except for 
some with inferior logs. Since the compensation of the mill opera-
tor was geared to the number of board feet of lumber produced, in-
ferior logs meant reduced revenue per hour of mill operation. 
96 See language of trial judge in overruling objection to the introduction of estimates 
in Record, p. 64, Moline Furniture Works v. Club Holding Co., 280 Mich. 587, 274 
N.W. 338 (1937): "I would hate to say as a matter of law that because they cannot 
show the exact number of hours or days they are not entitled to recover at all." 
97 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 (1888). 
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The mill was operated part of the season with such timber, and 
was idle for the rest of the season. 
If a "components" approach to valuation were taken, the 
plaintiff's subtrahend would be the total of the value of all the 
components that would have been saved had the mill been shut 
down upon notice of breach: saved overhead, saved wages for em-
ployees, etc. If an "entity" approach to valuation were taken, the 
plaintiff's subtrahend would be the resale value of the mill's capac-
ity for the season. If plaintiff's efforts to resell this mill were as 
vigorous and astute as the mitigation rule requires, what plaintiff 
actually grossed by the resale efforts in fact made would fix entity 
value here. The rules that should govern the choice between "en-
tity" and "components" valuation are discussed subsequently; the 
present purpose is merely to illustrate the two terms. 
In valuing either the entity or some single component, a 
court sometimes faces a choice among valuation techniques. If 
it is valuing a component which plaintiff had yet to acquire at 
the time of being notified of breach, valuation by reference to 
plaintiff and a reasonable man in plaintiff's plight leads to this 
technique-the value of the component is the lower of these two 
figures: (1) the lowest price at which plaintiff could have acquired 
the component, using reasonable efforts to acquire it as cheaply 
as possible, or (2) the price which plaintiff actually paid to ac-
quire it, in the event that by abnormal effort or risk he succeeded 
in acquiring it even more cheaply. This is "cost value," as that 
term is here used. 
A second technique is applicable to valuing some entities and 
some components which are on hand at notice of breach. It fixes 
value at the higher of two figures: (I) the highest price at which 
plaintiff could sell the item, using reasonable efforts to obtain the 
highest gross receipts, or (2) the gross receipts plaintiff actually 
received for the item if, by abnormal effort or risk, he succeeded 
in selling it at an even higher price. In determining the highest 
price at which it could be sold under this technique, the court is 
interested in the behavior of actual potential buyers, as their be-
havior is manifested in bidding on this item or in bidding on or 
buying similar items at similar times and places. Under this tech-
nique no evidence of the behavior of a hypothetical willing buyer 
is admissible. The technique is "actual resale value," as that term 
is here used. It is the buyer, not the sale, which is actual. The 
actual resale value of an item can be determined although in fact 
plaintiff never resold the item prior to trial. Even if plaintiff resold 
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the item prior to trial, its actual resale value may be higher than 
the gross receipts plaintiff received from that sale. 
The third technique can be called "hypothetical resale value." 
It differs from actual resale value only in this respect: in deter-
mining the highest price at which plaintiff could sell the item, 
using reasonable efforts to obtain the highest gross receipts, expert 
evidence as to the conduct of a hypothetical willing buyer is ad-
missible. Indeed, behind the fiction of this hypothetical purchaser 
the court is getting expert valuation based on a composite of many 
valuation techniques. 
Only one Michigan plaintiff-seller case, subsequently dis-
cussed,98 uses any other valuation technique. 
III. THE "COMPONENTS" APPROACH 
A. The Categories of Components Defined 
Plaintiff has the burden of proving the existence and value of 
some kinds of components; defendant has the burden of proving 
the existence and value of others. Some kinds of components are 
properly valued by one technique; others by different techniques. 
Some explanation of the various categories of components is re-
quired at the outset. 
For purposes of this article, components are sorted into five 
categories. The first group, "saved overhead," includes all items 
which would have been only partially consumed in plaintiff's 
post-breach performance.99 Such items are included whether they 
were "on hand" or "yet to be acquired" at the time plaintiff 
learned of the breach. If plaintiff's factory would have been used 
to perform the balance of his contract, but the factory would not, 
of course, have been wholly consumed in that process, some part 
of the value of that factory is an item of "saved overhead." Sim-
ilarly, if plaintiff had a permanent labor force, and some, but not 
98 See text at note 142 infra. While the minuend is sometimes valued by the profits 
lost on a collateral transaction which aborted upon defendant's breach, the subtrahend 
is never valued in this manner. Doctrines designed to restrict that valuation technique 
are inappropriate in the process of subtrahend valuation. See text supra at 866. 
99 Since the line between "overhead" and "non-overhead" items is somewhat arbitrary, 
close questions can arise. Where plaintiff would have used six more screws to finish the 
job, and screws are sold by the gross, did he save the non-overhead item called "six 
screws" or the overhead item called "4% of a gross of screws"? Close questions have not 
troubled the Michigan Supreme Court. If they arise they should be resolved by reference 
to the policy underlying this category: it is a catchall for items so hard to value that 
unusual tolerance is shown to the party seeking to approximate the value of the category. 
For an argument that no overhead should be deducted, see Note, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 
634 (1958). 
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all, of its time would have gone into completing the contract, a 
portion of its time is "saved overhead." 
It is not essential that plaintiff use an asset simultaneously on 
both defendant's contract and another contract to put the asset 
into this category. If the asset would retain some economic value 
for plaintiff at the end of plaintiff's scheduled performance for 
defendant, the asset is an overhead item, and that portion of its 
value which is allotted to the balance of plaintiff's contract is in 
the category of "saved overhead." 
The category of "saved overhead" is isolated from the others 
because of the peculiar difficulties of valuation which all items in 
this category share. Not only is some cost accounting required to 
determine the percentage of each asset which should be allotted 
to the balance of plaintiff's contract with defendant, but there is 
grave difficulty in proving the cost value or actual resale value of 
that fraction of the asset. In theory the court should seek the actual 
resale value of each "on hand" saved overhead item, and the cost 
value of each "yet to be acquired" saved overhead item. In prac-
tice it is necessary to lump together all "on hand" and "yet to be 
acquired" items in this category and use ro~gh approximations of 
the value of the entire category. From the remaining (non-over-
head) items, a second category can then be isolated: "saved non-
overhead items yet to be acquired."100 Items are yet to be acquired 
if plaintiff, at the time of notice of breach, could not by feasible 
means escape the cost of acquiring them. All items which the 
plaintiff had neither acquired nor contracted to acquire fall into 
this category. Also included are items which plaintiff had con-
tracted to acquire but which he could avoid acquiring without 
untoward consequence. Thus, if he could terminate his obligation 
to his supplier without loss of good will or substantial damages, 
the items he contracted to acquire should be classified in this 
category. Similarly, if the item was acquired under an arrange-
ment which permitted plaintiff to return it to the supplier and 
recover back the price paid for it, the item should be placed in 
this category. 
The unifying characteristic of all items in this category is that 
they are normally susceptible to item-by-item proof of value, and 
the appropriate valuation technique normally is cost value. In 
a single instance an item in this category should not be cost valued: 
if after notice of breach plaintiff nonetheless is shown to have ac-
100 The atrocious label is my own and I am properly ashamed of it. 
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quired the item and to have put it to a use which (a) would have 
been impossible but for a breach, and (b) which gives it a value 
to plaintiff greater than cost value. This exception reflects the 
general policy of taking breach-caused gains into account in the 
measurement of expectation damages. 
All remaining items are both non-overhead and "on hand." 
They should be valued by reference to the re-employment plain-
tiff does or should find for them. They are here divided into three 
remaining categories, depending on whether they consist of services, 
personalty, or realty. Services must be isolated because defendant 
has the burden of proving their value, whereas plaintiff has the 
burden of valuing realty and personalty, for reasons that will ap-
pear subsequently. Personalty and realty must be distinguished 
because, with certain exceptions, actual resale value is appropriate 
for the former, hypothetical resale value for the latter. 
It may be well to stress here the fact that the last three cate-
gories consist of non-overhead "on hand" services, personalty, and 
realty. If plaintiff's mm time would not be consumed entirely in 
the performance of the post-breach phase of his contract with de-
fendant, but would be distributed among the many contracts which 
plaintiff is performing simultaneously, his saved time goes into 
the first category, as saved overhead.101 
Although no Michigan Supreme Court case has involved such 
facts, it is possible to have saved non-overhead "on hand" services 
which are not those of plaintiff himself, but of an employee or con-
tractor whom he engaged to work exclusively on defendant's con-
tract. If the mitigation notion requires or permits plaintiff to put 
the employee or contractor to work on some other of plaintiff's 
projects rather than to repudiate the arrangement for services, 
the "on hand" saved non-overhead time of the employee or con-
tractor must be valued. If the mitigation notion requires or per-
mits plaintiff to repudiate his contract with this employee or con-
tractor, the price plaintiff would have paid him had he worked 
constitutes a non-overhead item "yet to be acquired," and the 
amount in damages plaintiff pays the employee or contractor are 
items of plaintiff's incidental damages. 
All saved components of plaintiff's post-breach performance 
should fit into one of these five categories: overhead items "yet 
to be acquired"; (non-overhead) items "yet to be acquired"; (non-
overhead) "on hand" services; (non-overhead) "on hand" person-
alty; (non-overhead) "on hand" realty. 
101 See discussion of the Callender case at note 121 infra. See also Note, supra note 99. 
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B. Problems of Categorization in Michigan 
Often there is no need to decide whether a particular compo-
nent falls into one category or another because, for the particular 
purpose at hand, both categories are treated identically. For ex-
ample, it is unnecessary to determine whether property "on hand" 
is realty or personalty for purposes of burden of proof; as will 
appear, plaintiff has the burden of proving the value of items in 
both categories. But the line between the two categories becomes 
important when a dispute arises over valuation technique: realty 
"on hand" normally is valued at hypothetical resale value, whereas 
personalty "on hand" normally is valued at actual resale value. 
The results reached in Michigan cases suggest that the court 
has had an intuitive appreciation of the categories just described, 
although it has rarely articulated the notions fully. The court has 
called the "overhead" category by that name,1°2 although it has 
never attempted to define the concept. However, the results 
reached suggest (with one possible exception) that the court's 
working concept of "overhead" is identical to that described in 
this article. The single instance in which the court may have used 
a different concept of "overhead" occurred in circumstances where 
such categorization was of no significance. 
In that case103 plaintiff trade journal sought damages from 
defendant advertiser when the latter repudiated its advertising 
contract in the middle of the one-year term during which defend-
ant's ad was to appear weekly in plaintiff's journal. Both at the 
trial and on appeal the courts used an "entity" approach, not a 
"components" approach, to value the subtrahend, treating the 
space which defendant's ad would have occupied as the saved 
"entity."104 But there was some cross-examination during the trial 
directed to the components of plaintiff's performance that were 
saved. Plaintiff's editor testified that plaintiff saved nothing be-
cause of the breach inasmuch as all of plaintiff's costs of publica-
tion were met by the revenue from the first sixty columns of ads 
printed in the journal, and all revenue after that was sheer profit. 
Apparently plaintiff had sixty columns of ads without including 
defendant's. The witness concluded that the plaintiff's profit on 
defendant's contract equalled the contract price.105 The trial judge 
102 E.g., Nurmi v. Beardsley, 284 Mich. 165, 278 N.W. 805 (1938); Federal Bond &: 
Mortgage Co. v. Burstein, 222 Mich. 88, 192 N.W. 549 (1923); Detroit Fireproofing Tile 
Co. v. Vinton Co., 190 Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916). ' 
103 Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., 147 Mich. 702, Ill N.W. 343 (1907). 
104 Record, p. 59, Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., supra note 103. 
10:; Id. p. 26. 
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made a finding to this effect, which the Michigan Supreme Court 
quoted with apparent approval,1°6 although the finding apparently 
had no effect on the ultimate decision of either court. 
The finding that plaintiff saved no overhead in this situation 
rests either on a tacit definition of overhead which differs from 
that presented here or on a factual assumption not wholly artic-
ulate. Either the courts tacitly defined "overhead" to embrace only 
items which plaintiff would not have acquired but for his contract 
with defendant,101 or they assumed that plaintiff actually had some 
items of saved overhead, but that these saved overhead items had 
a zero value to plaintiff. The latter would be a proper finding if 
plaintiff neither found nor should have found any feasible way to 
re-employ his breach-released overhead items, all of which were 
on hand at the time of breach. This may have been true in that 
case and may have been the thought the witness was trying to ex-
press. If so, the case is consistent with the treatment of overhead in 
this article. The other reading of the case-that "overhead" only 
includes items that plaintiff would not have acquired but for the 
plaintiff-defendant contracts-is inconsistent with the court's 
treatment of the concept in later cases,1°8 and ignores some of what 
plaintiff saved because of the breach. 
The court's recognition of the distinction between non-over-
head items "on hand" and non-overhead items "yet to be acquired" 
was explicit in Raycraft v. Northville-Six Mile Co.,100 and tacitly in-
dicated in the court's consistent use of cost valuation as to the latter 
items,110 and resale valuation of the former.111 Recognition of the 
distinction between realty and personalty "on hand" is similarly 
apparent from the court's consistent use of hypothetical resale 
value for the former,112 and actual resale value for the latter.113 
10s See Finding VIII, id. p. 49. 
101 The witness's reference to the sixty columns of other ads suggests that he meant 
that publishing defendant's ad would not require plaintiff to acquire additional overhead 
items. The ultimate question, however, seems to be whether the breach either released 
some of the time of "on hand" overhead items, or enabled plaintiff to avoid acquiring 
"yet to be acquired" overhead items. The witness ignored the first of these possibilities. 
10s See Federal Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Burstein, 222 Mich. 88, 192 N.W. 549 (1923); 
Detroit Fireproofing Tile Co. v. Vinton Co., 190 Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916). 
100 358 Mich. 466, 100 N.W.2d 223 (1960). 
110 See Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 222 Mich. 95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923); 
Brucker v. Manistee & G.R.R.R., 166 Mich. 330, 130 N.W. 822 (1911); Mueller v. Bethesda 
Mineral Spring Co., 88 Mich. 390, 50 N.W. 319 (1891). 
111 See Moline Furniture Works v. Club Holding Co., 280 Mich. 587, 274 N.W. 338 
(1937); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Zacks, 236 Mich. 698, 211 N.W. 22 (1926); Wells v. Board of 
Educ., 78 Mich. 260, 44 N.W. 267 (1889). 
112 See Hamburger v. Berman, 203 Mich. 78, 168 N.W. 925 (1918); Frederick v. 
Hillebrand, 199 Mich. 333, 165 N.W. 810 (1917); Allen v. Mohn, 86 Mich. 238, 49 N.W. 
626 (1891). 
113 See Gulf Vegetable &: Fruit Co. v. Lane, 258 Mich. 634, 242 N.W. 792 (1932); 
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And the recognition of a distinction between services "on hand" 
and all other types of components is clear from the consistent judi-
cial approach of giving defendant the burden of proving the 
farmer's value114 while giving plaintiff the burden of proving the 
value of the latter.115 
That these notions are not only inarticulate, but hazy, is sug-
gested by the court's rare efforts to explain its choice between 
valuation techniques or its choice as to which party should have the 
burden of proof. Usually the outcome is announced without sup-
porting rationale or citations, 116 but when citations are furnished 
or a rationale is offered, the rationale117 or citations118 are often 
unconvincing. The superiority of the results reached to the ra-
tionale offered for them-familiar in all common-law experience, 
but striking in this context-seems to suggest that the court relies 
most frequently on a mixture of intuitive insight and the abstract 
policies governing all expectation damage measurement, with 
little resort to such intermediate generalizations as parochial for-
mulae or the type of rules presented here. 
In only three cases has the court been required to categorize 
borderline items that did not clearly fit only one category. In the 
Roycraf t case,119 involving a choice between saved non-overhead 
"realty on hand" and saved non-overhead items "yet to be ac-
quired," the court properly chose the latter category. The case is 
discussed later in this article.120 
In Callender v. Myers Regulator Co.,121 plaintiff had agreed to 
Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255, 200 N.W. 252 (1924); Taylor v. Goldsmith, 228 Mich. 
259, 200 N.W. 254 (1924); Pandaleon v. Brecker, 227 Mich. 297, 198 N.W. 953 (1924). 
114 See Ogden v. George F. Alger Co., 353 Mich. 402, 91 N.W.2d 288 (1958); Edgecomb 
v. School Dist., 341 Mich. 106, 67 N.W.2d 87 (1954); Farrell v. School Dist., 98 Mich. 43, 
56 N.W. 1053 (1893). Cf. Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., 147 Mich. 702, Ill N.W. 343 
(1907). 
115 See Kolton v. Nassar, 358 Mich. 154, 99 N.W.2d 362 (1959); Mount Ida School 
for Girls v. Rood, 253 Mich. 482, 235 N.W. 227 (1931); International Textbook Co. v. 
Schulte, 151 Mich. 149, 114 N.W. 1031 (1908); Brownlee v. Bolton, 44 Mich. 218, 6 N.W. 
657 (1880). 
110 See, e.g., Brucker v. Manistee & G.R.R.R., 166 Mich. 330, 130 N.W. 822 (1911); 
Brighton v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry., 103 Mich. 420, 61 N.W. 550 (1894); Allen 
v. Mohn, 86 Mich. 328, 49 N.W. 626 (1891); Goodrich v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 62, 16 N.W. 
232 (1883); Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich. 239 (1872). 
117 E.g., Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 222 Mich. 95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923); 
Frederick v. Hillebrand, 199 Mich. 333, 165 N.W. 810 (1917); Burrell v. New York & 
Saginaw Solar Salt Co., 14 Mich. 34 (1865). 
118 E.g., Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Cp., 147 Mich. 702, Ill N.W. 343 (1907); 
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Corbit, 127 Mich. 473, 86 N.W. 954 (1901); Burrell v. New York & 
Saginaw Solar Salt Co., supra note 117. 
110 Raycraft v. Northville-Six Mile Co., 358 Mich. 466, 100 N.W.2d 223 (1960). 
120 See text at note 137 infra. 
121 250 Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930). See also Annot., 41 A.L.R. 1175 (1926). Cf. 
REsTATEMENT § 329, illustration 3. 
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sell defendant-manufacturer's product and to maintain a Detroit 
sales office for that purpose. Upon defendant's repudiation plain-
tiff took a new job paying 16,000 dollars per year. Neither party 
offered evidence to show whether or not plaintiff could have 
handled the new job and his contract with defendant simulta-
neously. Defendant claimed, with success at trial and on appeal, 
that on such a record the court should assume the two jobs were 
incompatible, that plaintiff saved 16,000 dollars per year by being 
discharged of his obligation to use his time for defendant's pur-
poses, and thus plaintiff should recover nothing (the minuend be-
ing less than 16,000 dollars). Plaintiff claimed that defendant had 
the burden of proving the incompatibility of the two jobs, and 
absent such proof plaintiff's saved "time" should be valued at 
zero. In Michigan "saved overhead" must be proved by plaintiff, 
non-overhead services "on hand" by defendant. Thus, it would 
appear that the outcome should turn on whether the time plaintiff 
would put on defendant's work was "overhead" or non-overhead 
services "on hand." However, this categorization was easy: inas-
much as plaintiff claimed that he could perform both contracts 
at once, he was taking the position that his time was an overhead 
item--one not wholly consumed in performing the contract with 
defendant. The court did not elaborate the reasons for its con-
clusion that defendant should prevail, but the result is wholly con-
sistent with the notions expressed here. 
In another case122 plaintiff was a partnership selling masonry 
services. The partners did some of the work themselves and hired 
employees to do other parts of the work. Defendant having repu-
diated the contract before the work was completed, it became im-
portant to know what part of the remaining work would have 
been done by plaintiffs themselves, and what part by employees. 
The employee portion would be valued at the saved cost of hiring 
such employees-1.50 dollars per hour. But, thought the trial 
court in charging the jury, the part that would have been done by 
plaintiffs themselves should not be valued at cost to plaintiff, but 
at the actual resale value of their saved "on hand" services. Having 
charged the jury to measure damages thus (although the jury 
had no way of knowing what proportion of the work would be 
done by plaintiffs themselves or what the actual resale value of 
their time was per hour), ana having seen the jury render a sub-
stantial verdict for plaintiff, the court then ordered remittitur. 
122 Hamilton v. Stephens, 240 Mich. 228, 215 N.W. 321 (1927). 
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It entered judgment for the reduced sum, the sum being derived 
on the assumption that all the saved time should be valued at 1.50 
dollars per hour. This judgment was affirmed. 
The result was correct. Although the trial court never ex-
plained its rationale and the appellate court gave none, the result 
can be defended in this manner: the actual resale value of plain-
tiff's own saved time was at least 1.50 dollars per hour; there was 
at least one potential employer willing to pay plaintiff this much 
for their services-the partnership itself; this appeared from the 
fact that after breach the partnership continued to hire employees 
at that rate, thus demonstrating that it considered the partners' 
time at least that valuable. 
Thus, the necessity to decide if the saved services were those of 
the plaintiffs or those of yet to be hired employees vanished, and 
the 1.50 dollars per hour figure was correct on either assumption. 
C. Valuing Saved Overhead 
Were there neither problems of proof nor of accounting, the 
process of valuing plaintiff's saved overhead might ~xhibit the 
following sequence: (I) listing of all non-overhead items that 
would go into completion of plaintiff's performance, directly or 
indirectly; (2) elimination by the court of those items on the list 
that contribute only indirectly, that is, breach does not "release" 
them for other profitable re-employment by plaintiff;123 (3) elim-
ination of those direct non-overhead items remaining which plain-
tiff after breach neither re-employed nor was obligated by the 
mitigation notion to re-employ; (4) determination of the percent-
age of each of the remaining items on the list that should be al-
located to the performance of the balance of plaintiff's contract 
with defendant; (5) valuation of each of these remaining items at 
cost of acquisition (if they were yet to be acquired at notice of 
breach and never acquired afterw1rd), or by reference to the use 
to which they were or should have been put (if they were on hand 
at notice of breach or acquired after breach); (6) totalling the 
values thus determined of the various saved overhead items to give 
the value to plaintiff of total saved overhead. 
The second and sixth of these steps present no insuperable 
problems of marshalling proof, but the other four steps do. The 
third and fifth steps in particular will usually prove impossible for 
either party to establish with any certainty. 
123 Examples are plaintiff's good will and his immunity from prosecution "purchased" 
by paying various taxes and license fees. Arguably these are not "costs." 
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The Michigan Supreme Court in effect has permitted the party 
with the burden of proving saved overhead to carry that burden 
by a simplified process of proof. In this simplified process "expert" 
testimony is used to establish: (I) the share of plaintiff's enterprise-
wide overhead costs that should be allocated to this contract, and 
(2) the percentage of this contract unperformed at the time of 
notice of breach. By multiplying these figures together an estimate 
of saved overhead is established.124 
To arrive at the first figure witnesses have been permitted to 
testify regarding the "average" ratio that obtains in contracts of 
this sort between contract price and overhead costs.125 Thus, one 
witness testified that on the average his overhead costs ran to 
twelve percent of the contract price, and from this the inference 
was drawn that the total overhead costs of performing this contract 
would have been twelve percent of the contract price.126 
The percentage of the contract unperformed by plaintiff when 
notified of defenq.ant' s breach has been established by proof of the 
ratio of variable costs incurred to total variable costs.127 
Thus, in one case where the contract price was 14,315 dollars, 
the percentage of work unperformed was 43.8 percent, and "we 
usually figure 12 percent [ of the contract price for total overhead 
costs of the contract]," the court in effect multiplied together 
(14,315 dollars) (12 percent) (43.8 percent) and arrived at saved 
overhead.128 The same technique has met with apparent approval 
in other cases also.129 Indeed, there appears to be no case in which 
defendant insisted on proof of saved overhead130 in which plaintiff 
succeeded in carrying the burden131 in any other fashion. 
124 See Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co. v. Plywood Prods. Corp., 311 Mich. 226, 
18 N.W.2d 387 (1945); Nurmi v. Beardsley, 284 Mich. 165, 278 N.W. 805 (1938); Federal 
Bond &: Mortgage Co. v. Burstein, 222 Mich. 88, 192 N.W. 549 (1923); other cases cited 
in notes 86-94 supra. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Nurmi v. Beardsley, 284 Mich. 165, 174-76, 278 N.W. 805, 808-09 (1938). 
121 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
120 See H. 0. Brackney &: Son v. Ryniewicz, 346 Mich. 404, 78 N.W.2d 127 (1956); 
Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co. v. Plywood Prods. Corp., 311 Mich. 226, 18 N.W.2d 
387 (1945). Only in the Nurmi case, supra note 126, did plaintiff attempt to prove the 
percentage of performance incomplete at the time of breach. In the cases here cited 
breach preceded performance. 
130 In Demirjian v. Kurtis, 353 Mich. 619, 91 N.W.2d 841 (1958), defendant acquiesced 
in treating saved overhead at zero after cross-examination revealed it was at most a 
trifling figure. In Harrington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 166 Mich. 276, 131 
N.W. 559 (1911), defendant abandoned on appeal his earlier objection to plaintiff's 
technique of asking an expert what profit plaintiff would have made on the contract. 
In other cases defendant never objected to the fact that plaintiff wholly ignored saved 
overhead. E.g., Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich. 239 (1872). 
131 Plaintiff failed to carry the burden in three cases, but in all of them he offered 
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This simplified method of proof helps the party with the bur-
den to carry it, but he carries it in a fashion which is very likely 
to overestimate the value of saved overhead to plaintiff. Of the 
six steps listed previously, the first is avoided completely. The 
second is avoided, but in the process of avoiding it the court over-
estimates the value of saved overhead since "indirect" overhead 
items are treated identically with "direct" items.132 The third step 
is avoided, but only by the (arbitrary) assumption that plaintiff 
had no overhead items on hand at the time of notice of breach 
and never acquired any of them subsequently. The fourth step 
is simplified by using the ratio of variable costs yet to be incurred 
to total variable costs as the percentage in question for every over-
head item-an arbitrary assumption that may either overstate or 
understate the value of saved overhead. The fifth step is simplified 
by the assumption already noted: that all overhead items are yet 
to be acquired and are never acquired post-breach. If plaintiff 
remains in business after the breach, this assumption is obviously 
false. Even if he does not remain in business, it is unlikely that 
he had no overhead items "on hand" at notice of breach if defend-
ant's contract was not the first contract ever performed by plain-
tiff. The simplification of this fifth step goes the farthest toward 
overstatement of saved overhead, ignoring as it does the very likely 
possibility that plaintiff cannot re-employ all breach-released 
overhead, or that its re-employment is less valuable than its ac-
quisition cost value.133 The sixth step, of course, is avoided. 
The writer has no basic quarrel with the simplified approach 
to valuing saved overhead used in the Michigan cases. While per-
fect accuracy requires that overhead items on hand should be 
valued according to the use to which they were or should have 
been put after breach, the practical difficulties of mustering such 
proof are so great that it is wise to settle for proof which is less 
no proof of saved overhead, simplified or otherwise. See Mount Ida School for Girls v. 
Rood, 253 Mich. 482, 235 N.W. 227 (1931); Detroit Fireproofing Tile Co. v. Vinton Co., 
190 Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916); International Te.xtbook Co. v. Schulte, 151 Mich. 
149, 114 N.W. 1031 (1908). 
132 The term "indirect overhead item," as used here, refers to one of plaintiff's 
commodities which is no more ayailable for other use by plaintiff, after plaintiff has been 
relieved of his obligation to complete performance for defendant, than it would have 
been had plaintiff not been so relieved. The concept is not the same as any of the 
of the various accountant's concepts that are labelled "indirect costs." I have found 
no Michigan case in which a plaintiff attempted to exclude from his proof of saved 
overhead "indirect overhead items," on the ground that such items are not capable 
of being "saved." The court should accept such an argument, were it made. 
133 See Note, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 634, 637 n.13 (1958). 
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accurate, but more feasible to gather. Insisting on more theoretical 
accuracy would only result in inability to prove saved overhead 
at all; in that event the court would be compelled either to assume 
that saved overhead had a zero value to plaintiff (if defendant was 
given the burden of proving it), or to deprive plaintiff of expec~ 
tation damages (if plaintiff had the burden). Either assumption 
would result in a judgment further distorted from reality than 
the judgment rendered when saved overhead is proved in the 
fashion now tolerated by the court. 
The problems of cost accounting and proof are so great in 
· regard to this item that little in the way of hard-and-fast valuation 
rules seems desirable. Courts should, as the Michigan court does, 
relax the "certainty" rule to make admissible such proof as is 
both feasible to muster and reasonably geared to approximate 
reality. Of course, where the sums at stake are larger, and it is 
feasible for counsel to use more expert testimony based on more 
extensive trial preparation, the standards should be higher. 
D. Burden of Proving Saved Overhead 
The Michigan Supreme Court gives the plaintiff the burden 
of proving saved overhead.134 As indicated, it permits him some 
leeway in carrying this burden, but the simplified method of proof 
which it tolerates still resolves some important questions against 
him. The plaintiff who succeeds in avoiding a directed verdict 
against him by use of the simplified proof nonetheless is probably 
undercompensated. The amount of undercompensation varies di-
rectly with the ratio of his overhead items to all items. If he is in 
a trade in which overhead items figure prominently, he is grossly 
undercompensated. 
The only solution to this problem would be to permit plain-
tiff to establish prima facie his -saved overhead by the simplified 
method, and then to try to reduce that figure by showing specific 
overhead items ( either on hand at breach or reasonably acquired 
after breach) that would have gone into his post-breach perform-
ance and which plaintiff neither did re-employ nor should have 
fully re-employed. Apparently no plaintiff has attempted such a 
showing, perhaps because of its difficulty. But should the attempt 
be made, the court would be well-advised to allow it. 
Only two major alternatives to the current Michigan solution 
suggest themselves, and both seem inferior to it. One would give 
134 See cases cited in note 115 supra. See also Callender v. Myers Regulator Co., 250 
Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930) (semble), discussed in the text at note 121 supra. 
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defendant the burden of proving saved overhead, but permit him 
to use the simplified method of proof. In cases where the sim-
plified method could not be used (for example, where plaintiff 
lacked sufficient experience to form an estimate of his average 
ratio of overhead costs to gross receipts in contracts of this sort), 
the result would err toward overcompensation, which is undesira-
ble. Moreover, this solution would in all cases give the burden 
to the party with inferior access to the evidence. 
In the prior article135 I suggested the other alternative-giving 
defendant the burden of proof without resort to the simplified 
method of proof. I was led to this by a preference for overcom-
pensation, rather than its converse, and by fears lest a plaintiff lose 
his entire expectation damage remedy for lack of proof of some 
trifling item of overhead. Now in the ranks of the friends of un-
dercompensation, I see little value in this alternative. Moreover, 
since counsel almost always prove saved overhead by this simpli-
fied route, in which there is little peril of some small item being 
omitted (since the whole matter is handled much more crudely), 
fears of plaintiff losing his whole case for uncertain proof of a 
trifling item seem unrealistic. The existing Michigan solution 
seems the best of the (admittedly poor) alternatives open to courts. 
Perhaps it should be tempered in one small way: in the event 
plaintiff does attempt to establish saved overhead item by item, 
and he fails to include some fairly trifling items, at least if he had 
no expectation remedy except for damages, his omissions should 
be ignored, or adjusted by an arbitrary deduction of some sum 
from his recovery, rather than necessitate the denial of all ex-
pectation damages.136 
E. Valuing Saved Non-Overhead Items "Yet To Be Acquired" 
Normally such items should be valued by reference to their 
cost value, i.e., the lower of two figures: what plaintiff actually 
paid to acquire them, or the lowest price he would have paid had 
he used reasonable efforts to acquire them as cheaply as possible. 
The rare situation in which an item in this category is valued 
136 Harris, A General Theory for Measuring Seller's Damages for Total Breach of 
Contract, 60 MrcH. L. REv. 577 (1962). 
136 By treating the contract as "divisible" and confining plaintiff to failure to carry 
the burden as to that particular segment of the contract, a court can minimize the impact 
of failing to carry the burden in some instances. For example, plaintiff can recover for 
his pre-breach performance, although he fails to recover for the post-breach phase. 
E.g., Davey v. Sanders, 253 Mich. 137, 234 N.W. 128 (1931); Reynolds v. Levi, 122 Mich. 
115, 80 N.W. 999 (1899). 
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above its cost to plaintiff has two characteristics: (a) after breach 
plaintiff nonetheless acquires the item, and (b) plaintiff then puts 
it to a use which (i) would have been impossible had plaintiff per-
formed his contract with defendant, and (ii) gives the item a value 
to plaintiff greater than the cost of acquisition. This exception 
reflects the abstract guiding policy that breach-caused gains must 
be taken into account in measuring expectation damages. 
For example, assume plaintiff agreed to sell Blackacre to de-
fendant for 30,000 dollars at a date one year after the date of 
contract formation. At the time of contract formation plaintiff 
did not own Blackacre, but had an option to buy it from its owner 
for 25,000 dollars. On the date for closing with defendant the 
hypothetical resale value of Blackacre is 32,000 dollars and de-
fendant defaults. If plaintiff then fails to exercise his option, the 
land should be valued at the cost of it which plaintiff avoided in-
curring-25 ,000 dollars. But if plaintiff upon defendant's breach 
nonetheless exercises the option, the land should be valued at 
32,000 dollars. In the latter event plaintiff's post-breach behavior 
has enabled him to make a gain caused by breach, and this gain 
must be taken into account. 
A Michigan case presented the former situation, with plaintiff 
failing to exercise the option upon defendant's breach. The court 
properly valued the land by cost value.137 The case is significant 
because the court rejected defendant's argument to the effect that 
saved realty should always be valued at hypothetical resale value 
whether "yet to be acquired" or "on hand" at the time of notice 
of breach.138 
F. Burden of Proving the Value of Saved Non-Overhead Items 
"Yet To be Acquired" 
Although no Michigan case clearly raises the question of bur-
den of proof on items in this category, it is clear that courts and 
counsel have universally assumed that plaintiff has the burden 
of proof.139 The one dictum in point is in agreement.14° This 
appears wise, inasmuch as plaintiff has superior access to the evi-
dence and undercompensation is preferable to its converse. The 
sole disadvantage is the peril that in some case plaintiff will fail 
137 Roycraft v. Northville-Six Mile Co., 358 Mich. 466, 100 N.W.2d 223 (1960). 
138 Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. 21, Roycraft v. Northville-Six Mile Co., supra 
note 137. 
139 See Kolton v. Nassar, 358 Mich. 154, 99 N.W.2d 362 (1959). 
140 Ibid. 
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to prove a single item, or some trifling few items, and be visited 
with the Draconian sanction of denial of all expectation damages 
recovery. If this occurs in a case where plaintiff had no price 
remedy or specific performance remedy available as an alternative 
route to vindicate his expectation interest, the burden will have 
worked injustice. 
But the reported Michigan Supreme Court opinions fail to 
reveal such an instance, perhaps because the trial judges have 
turned a deaf ear to defendant's criticism of trifling omissions in 
plaintiff's proof of this category of components. 
If plaintiff attempts to establish the value of an item in this 
category at cost value, and defendant wants it valued higher (on 
the theory that plaintiff nonetheless acquired it after breach and 
put it to a use impossible, but for breach, and more valuable to 
plaintiff than its cost), defendant should have the burden of prov-
ing this state of facts. Since he is attempting to raise the value 
of the subtrahend, less Draconian consequences attend defendant's 
failure to carry the burden than would accompany plaintiff's. 
Moreover, in cases where the "components" approach is proper, 
the probabilities are against this state of affairs ever arising. No 
Michigan case presents this question. 
G. Valuing Saved Non-Overhead Realty "on Hand" 
As indicated earlier, "on hand" items are not properly-valued 
by their cost. Moreover, actual resale value is inappropriate in 
most cases involving realty. Actual resale value turns on the 
highest price an actual buyer was willing to pay for the land on 
the date of valuation. Since on any given day there are usually 
few buyers, if any, interested in a given tract except those who are 
in the market for a sacrifice sale, actual resale value of land tends 
to reflect the sacrifice sale market. Inasmuch as most tracts would 
bring substantially more if kept on the market longer, actual 
resale value understates the land's resale value in many instances. 
Hypothetical resale valuation of land avoids this difficulty, since 
the expert describes a willing buyer, not a sacrifice sale buyer. 
The Michigan cases permit hypothetical resale valuation of the 
saved realty.141 
141 See cases cited in note 112 supra. See also Annots., 7 A.L.R.2d 781 (1949); 52 
A.L.R. 1511 (1928). I have suggested that hypothetical resale value should be confined to 
realty and actual resale value should be applied to personalty. There is administrative con-
venience in this, but it erroneously values a few items. Short-term leases, for reasons 
elaborated later, should not be valued at hypothetical resale value unless an adjustment 
is made. See text infra at 888, relating to a discussion of valuing saved services "on 
hand." 'Where the personalty being valued is valuable, but slow-moving, and no alter-
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If plaintiff has not resold the saved realty before trial and the 
probabilities are high that he never had and never will have an 
opportunity to resell it, neither actual nor hypothetical resale 
value should be used. Some other valuation technique must be 
attempted to measure what economic benefit, if any, plaintiff 
gained by not transferring this realty to defendant. In one Mich-
igan case142 plaintiff saved clay which defendant had contracted to 
extract from plaintiff's land and make into bricks. There was evi-
dence that the clay had no value to anyone except an adjacent brick 
manufacturer, and defendant, the only person that fit that cate-
gory, was not interested in the clay. The court, quite properly, 
suggested that rather than valuing the clay at zero, as the trial 
judge had done, the parties should be permitted to show "whether 
plaintiff's land is worth more, and if so how much more, without 
the clay having been excavated than it would have been if it had 
been excavated 12 to 15 feet below the natural level of the land."143 
In the circumstances, it was a sensible approach to valuation, since 
it was most unlikely that plaintiff would realize any economic 
gain by resale of the saved clay, but not unlikely that he would 
some day realize gain by selling the entire tract for purposes other 
than clay excavation. 
H. Burden of Proving the Value of Saved Realty 
The Michigan court very properly gives plaintiff the burden 
of proving the value of saved realty.144 This gives the burden to 
the party who more often has superior access to the evidence, pre-
fers undercompensation to its converse, and places the burden on 
the party who usually suffers least if he fails to carry it. Where 
plaintiff cannot establish the hypothetical resale value of the land 
(a rare situation), he normally can vindicate his expectations by 
resort to a price or specific performance remedy.145 
I. Valuing Personalty "on Hand" 
As with all "on hand" items, cost value is irrelevant, and valu-
ation should be done by reference to the best use to which plain-
native remedy, such as price or specific performance, is available to the seller, hypothetical 
resale value should be used for the same reasons as in the realty cases. A ship, for example, 
should be valued in this manner. No Michigan case raises the problem. 
142 Milligan v. Haggerty, 296 Mich. 62, 295 N.W. 560 (1941). 
143 Id. at 72, 295 N.W. at 564. 
144 See McColl v. Wardowski, 280 Mich. 374, 273 N.W. 736 (1937). 
145 Price remedy: Wesorick v. Winans, 277 Mich. 589, 269 N.W. 609 (1936); Allen 
v. Mohn, 86 Mich. 328, 49 N.W. 626 (1891); Curran v. Rogers, 35 Mich. 221 (1876). 
Specific performance: Lutz v. Dutmer, 286 Mich. 467, 282 N.W. 431 (1938); Pearson v. 
Gardner, 202 Mich. 360, 168 N.W. 485 (1918). 
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tiff either does, or should have, put the saved personalty. Normally 
the best use is "resale" on terms substantially the same as the 
attempted "sale" to defendant. ("Sale" is used here to include 
bailment, if the original contract with defendant was one of bail-
ment-a "sale" of the temporary use of the goods.) 
Actual, not hypothetical, resale value normally should be used 
because of its superior accuracy. Where prior to trial plaintiff 
made a resale that accords with mitigation notions, 146 it should fix 
actual resale value. Absent any resale, or absent proof that the re-
sale met mitigation tests, the court has a variety of devices avail-
able for approximating actual resale value: (I) evidence of bids 
solicited by plaintiff from potential purchasers of the personalty 
at or about the time of breach notice;147 (2) prices prevailing in 
commodity exchanges at the time of breach notice, the exchanges 
in question being feasibly accessible to plaintiff;148 (3) prices pre-
vailing in commodity exchanges either at a different time than 
when notice of the breach was received or at an exchange not 
feasibly accessible to plaintiff, but with an allowance for transpor-
tation expenses to that exchange.149 
No Michigan case has faced the situation in which plaintiff's 
only evidence of the resale value of personalty is expert testimony 
of what a willing buyer would have paid.150 The Michigan court's 
146 To establish that the actual sale was in accord with mitigation notions, plaintiff 
should be permitted to show his efforts to obtain the highest possible price. Statutes 
often prescribe the procedures for such a sale, providing in that event for a statutory 
remedy which is identical to expectation damages in all respects but one-the value of 
the subtrahend is fixed at the gross receipts of such a sale even if the sale did not occur 
on the date when the subtrahend would otherwise be valued. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws 
§ 440.60 (1948); UNIFORM SALES ACT § 60. See generally Annots., 119 A.L.R. 1141 (1939); 
44 A.L.R. 296 (1926). 
147 See Record, pp. 59-60, Gulf Vegetable & Fruit Co. v. Lane, 258 Mich. 634, 242 
N.W. 792 (1932); Record, pp. 94-96, Taylor v. Goldsmith, 228 Mich. 259, 200 N.W. 254 
(1924). 
148 See Record, pp. 22, 37-39, Taylor v. Goldsmith, supra note 147; Record, pp. 90, 
106, Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Co., 222 Mich. 95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923). See also 
Annot., 44 A.L.R. 358 (1926). 
140 See Pandaleon v. Brecker, 227 Mich. 297, 198 N.W. 953 (1924); Aulls v. Young, 98 
Mich. 231, 57 N.W. 119 (1893); Simons v. Ypsilanti Paper Co., 77 Mich. 185, 43 N.W. 
864 (1889). 
150 Where defendant objects to such evidence as uncertain and plaintiff still has 
available a price or specific performance remedy, he should be forced to use those 
remedies rather than to expose defendant to the risk of overcompensation. Where neither 
of those expectation-vindicating remedies are available, the decision cannot be made 
intelligently by hard and fast rules, but must tum on such things as: (I) whether plain-
tiff's failure to establish actual resale value reflected the difficulties inherent in the 
situation or slipshod trial preparation; (2) the amount of overcompensation to which 
defendant would be exposed by hypothetical resale value testimony; (3) whether plain-
tiff earlier had an opportunity to avoid his present dilemma by a proper resale according 
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valuation of saved personalty differs in no way from the views here 
expressed.151 
J. Valuing Non-Overhead Services "on Hand" 
The Michigan Supreme Court has encountered only one kind 
of non-overhead services "on hand"-the full-time services of the 
individual plaintiff himself (or partners themselves) which, but 
for breach, would have been devoted to the performance of the 
balance of his contract with defendant. The court has valued such 
items consistently at actual resale value, the appropriate valuation 
technique.152 Cost valuation of all "on hand" items is inappropri-
ate, as indicated previously. Indeed, it is impossible in this situ-
ation. As between actual resale value and hypothetical resale value 
the former is to be preferred. Use of hypothetical resale value, 
with its arbitrary assumption that a willing buyer exists, distorts 
reality if in fact no such buyer exists. In its application to prop-
erty to be transferred permanently this distortion deprives plain-
tiff only of compensation for the interest on the resale value of 
the land between the date of breach and the date when he actually 
could have resold the land. Compared to the total value of the 
land, this sum is trifling. Applied to "on hand" services, however, 
hypothetical resale value distorts reality much more.103 It deprives 
plaintiff of compensation for the saved time itself during the in-
terval between breach and the date when actual resale would occur. 
to mitigation standards, or by suing for price or specific performance; (4) whether the 
commodity is valuable, but slow-moving. See note 141 supra. 
A comparable situation involving a plaintiff-buyer arose in Sauer v. McClintic-
Marshall Constr. Co., 189 Mich. 577, 155 N.W. 586 (1915). Plaintiff carried the bur-
den of proving "market value" (the highest price a reasonable man in plaintiff's 
plight would have paid for cover goods upon defendant's failure to deliver as agreed) 
by expert testimony as to the market value of such goods on the critical day. Plaintiff 
could not establish market value in any other way since there was no organized exchange 
anywhere for the goods in question (structural steel designed for this one project), and 
plaintiff never sampled the market by soliciting bids after breach. Plaintiff had no 
specific performance or price remedy available, and the jury verdict affirmed was for 
$651-some $400 less than the spread between the contract price and the price plaintiff 
in fact paid to the seller with whom he covered. 
151 See, e.g., Peters v. Cooper, 95 Mich. 191, 54 N.W. 694 (1893); Simons v. Ypsilanti 
Paper Co., 77 Mich. 185, 43 N.W. 864 (1889); Brownlee v. Bolton, 44 Mich. 218, 6 N.W. 
657 (1880). See also Annot., 130 A.L.R. 1336 (1941). 
152 See, e.g., Ogden v. George F. Alger Co., 353 Mich. 402, 91 N.W.2d 288 (1958): 
Edgecomb v. School Dist., 341 Mich. 106, 67 N.W.2d 87 (1954): Callender v. Myers 
Regulator Co., 250 Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930); Hamilton v. Stephens, 240 Mich. 
228, 215 N.W. 321 (1927); Farrell v. School Dist., 98 Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053 (1893). 
153 It has similar distorting effects whenever the saved commodity is the "time" of 
someone or something. That is, whenever the contract called for a temporary transfer 
of the benefit of something. The shorter the "time" saved, the more significant the 
distortion. 
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Since the defendant-employer has the greatest incentive to breach 
in times of recession or depression, which are the times when plain-
tiff has the greatest difficulty in finding re-employment, the result 
is undercompensation (and reduced deterrence of breach) at the 
precise time when there is the greatest social need for full com-
pensation and such deterrence as accompanies it. • 
Actual resale value, while better than hypothetical resale value, 
still has a major disadvantage: in some situations the party with 
the burden of proving what plaintiff should have earned by rea-
sonable efforts to resell his released time cannot carry the burden 
despite diligent trial preparation. Thus, allocation of the burden 
frequently results in a judicial choice between over and under-
compensation. The situations that cause trouble are those in which 
plaintiff, for all or part of the term of his contract remaining after 
breach, fails to secure other employment which pays him as much 
as he would have earned under the contract. If plaintiff has the 
burden of showing that he could not have earned more by reason-
able efforts to mitigate, he usually cannot demonstrate the fact. 
If defendant must prove he could have earned more (and how 
much more), he usually cannot prove the fact.154 The methods 
of proving actual resale value conventionally used in cases in-
volving personaltyrn5 are ill-adapted to the cases where saved "on 
hand" services are involved. And, unlike plaintiff-lessor, plaintiff-
employee has no alternative expectation remedy156 to vindicate 
his expectation interest. 
K. Burden of Proving Saved Non-Overhead Services "on Hand" 
The Michigan courts properly give defendant the burden of 
proving the value of this component.157 This casts the burden 
on the party with inferior access to the evidence, and raises some 
lu4 In no Michigan case has defendant carried this burden successfully. 
ltiti See text at note 146 supra. 
lti6 The plaintiff-employee has an alternative remedy of money restitution (quantum 
meruit), but this only vindicates his restitution interesL To the extent that his expecta-
tion interest exceeds his restitution interest quantum meruit recovery is undercompensa-
tory. The problem is acute where plaintiff has yet to perform the bulk of a contract which 
would be very profitable, or where he has rendered much of his performance but as yet 
has delivered nothing to defendant. E.g., Hosmer v. Wilson, 7 Mich. 293 (1859) (plaintiff-
seller was to manufacture and deliver an engine; repudiation by defendant preceded 
completion of the engine; no recovery permitted for "work and labor done'). At one 
time plaintiff had a price recovery on the now discredited doctrine of "constructive 
service." See Annots., 17 A.L.R. 629 (1922); 8 A.L.R. 338 (1920). 
Hi7 See Ogden v. George F. Alger Co., 353 Mich. 402, 91 N.W.2d 288 (1958); Edge-
comb v. School Dist., 341 Mich. 106, 67 N.W.2d 87 (1954); Farrell v. School Dist., 98 
Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053 (1893). 
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risk of overcompensation.158 However, the risk of overcompensa-
tion is not too great. While defendant normally cannot prove 
with requJsite certainty what plaintiff should have earned, 100 he 
usually can prove what plaintiff in fact earned with his breach-
released time.160 Thus, the maximum overcompensation which is 
likeTy to occur is the difference between what plaintiff earned 
and what he should have earned. 
For those parts of the term during which plaintiff found full-
time re-employment the probabilities are that he found work as 
remunerative as the mitigation notion would require him to find. 
For those parts of the term during which plaintiff failed to take 
full-time re-employment, there is some likelihood that more effort 
would have produced a job, especially if plaintiff is not the head 
of the household, and is tempted to retire from the labor force 
upon defendant's breach.161 If plaintiff is the head of the house-
hold, the probabilities are that the idleness was forced, rather 
than voluntary. It would be unusual for a full-time employee to 
watch his income stop altogether in the hope that successful liti-
gation will recoup it without labor. 
Such risks of overcompensation as exist in this handling of 
the burden should be run.162 In this situation, overcompensation, 
not its converse, facilitates loss distribution and loss absorption. 
Normally the full-time employee is much less able to perform 
these functions than defendant, his employer. Splitting the loss 
among them puts part of it on the plaintiff-employee, who nor-
mally cannot distribute it in the cost of his product nor absorb 
it without serious dislocation of his family's economy. 
L. Minor Adjustments to the Value of Components and 
Incidental Damages 
Where breach enabled plaintiff to avoid acquiring a particular 
item, what he saved by not acquiring it may exceed the price he 
158 See Ogden v. George F. Alger Co., supra note 157, where defendant failed to show 
what plaintiff earned or should have earned during a ten-year term. Plaintiff-employee 
recovered over $40,000 when the subtrahend was valued at zero, although the record sug-
gests that plaintiff's actual earnings from two new enterprises were substantial. 
159 See note 154 supra. 
160 E.g., Gallino v. Boland, 221 Mich. 502, 191 N.W. 222 (1922); Milligan v. Sligh 
Furniture Co., 111 Mich. 629, 70 N.W. 133 (1897). But see Ogden v. George F. Alger Co., 
353 Mich. 402, 91 N.W.2d 288 (1958). 
161 The possibility was present in several cases in which plaintiff-schoolteachers 
failed to obtain re-employment. E.g., Edgecomb v. School Dist., 341 Mich. 106, 67 N.W.2d 
87 (1954); Farrell v. School Dist., 98 Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053 (1893). But it is also possible 
that no other teaching job could be found at the time when defendant breached. 
162 If the saved non-overhead services on hand are those of plaintiff's employee or 
contractor, this is not true, and the burden should be plaintiff's. No Michigan case 
involves such facts. 
1963] THE SELLER'S DAMAGES 891 
would have paid for the item. If, but for breach, he would have 
incurred miscellaneous additional charges in the process of locat-
ing a supplier, transporting the item to his storage point or job 
site, or maintaining and protecting the item until the time it is 
used in performing defendant's contract, these additional saved 
charges should be reflected in the subtrahend. They should be 
valued at cost and defendant should have the burden of proving 
their existence and value. Since they represent additions to the 
subtrahend, the consequences for defendant for failing to carry 
the burden as to any one of them are less dire than plaintiff's 
consequences would be. No Michigan case appears to raise an 
issue as to such items. 
Where plaintiff did or should have resold "on hand" compo-
nents, the actual resale value of the components does not neces-
sarily accurately reflect their value to plaintiff. In the process of 
actually reselling them he may have been obliged to incur charges 
in finding a new purchaser, delivering the items to him, or main-
taining and protecting the items during the interval between no-
tice of breach and resale. These charges should be subtracted from 
the subtrahend to reflect more accurately what plaintiff saved be-
cause of defendant's breach. His true savings are not the gross 
receipts the resale purchaser paid, but the gross receipts less those 
charges. 
Often plaintiff incurred, or would have incurred, charges of 
a similar kind had he completed performance with defendant. 
Without breach his performance might entail expense in locating 
defendant as a buyer, storing or maintaining property slated for 
delivery to defendant, freight to defendant, etc. If these have al-
ready been incurred they have no proper place in the subtrahend; 
they were not saved.163 If they have not been incurred, they have 
been taken into account already as non-overhead items "yet to 
be incurred." For example, if plaintiff incurred liability to a 
broker who found defendant as a prospective purchaser, and de-
fendant's breach does not enable plaintiff to escape such liability, 
the broker's commission is not relevant to subtrahend valuation. 
If plaintiff incurs another broker's charge for finding the resale 
purchaser, that second broker's commission should be taken into 
account as an adjustment of the subtrahend or in some other 
fashion. Otherwise the subtrahend is overvalued. If defendant's 
163 They are relevant to a reliance damage remedy, however. See Biddle v. Biddle, 
202 Mich. 160, 168 N.W. 92 (1918). But see Hubbard v. Epworth, 69 Mich. 92, 36 N.W. 
801 (1888). 
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breach lets plaintiff escape liability to the first broker, the service 
for which such broker would have collected but for breach is a 
non-overhead item "yet to be acquired." 
In one Michigan case164 a Detroit plaintiff saved goods which 
he had contracted to deliver to defendant in Ypsilanti. After 
breach he resold them to a buyer in Milwaukee. The court held 
that plaintiff should recover the difference between (the contract 
price less the freight from Detroit to Ypsilanti) and (the gross re-
ceipts paid by the Milwaukee purchaser less the freight from 
Detroit to Milwaukee). This achieved the same effect as the 
treatment suggested here. 
Some courts on occasion treat these extra charges attending 
resale as items of incidental damages. This treatment does not 
alter the result (if double-counting is avoided),165 except in the 
rare case where the subtrahend, even when adjusted so as to re-
flect these charges, exceeds the minuend. In that situation these 
charges are recovered if treated as incidental damages and not re-
covered if treated as adjustments to the subtrahend.166 
Where the saved component is realty, and it has been resold 
before trial, these additional charges should be recovered in sim-
ilar fashion. 
If the component is being valued by actual or hypothetical resale 
value, although there has been no resale prior to trial, these charges 
have not in fact been incurred, and it is impossible to treat the 
charges as items of incidental damages. Nonetheless, if their exist-
ence and value are shown with requisite certainty, they should be 
recovered as adjustments to the subtrahend. For example, if it is 
clear that plaintiff would have had to pay a broker at least 1,000 
dollars to effect a resale, the 1,000 dollars should be taken into 
account although plaintiff has not and never will resell. If he had 
resold, the assumption under which the item was valued, he would 
have incurred this charge. 
Plaintiff should have the burden of proving the existence and 
value of all such charges. Since they enhance the value of the sub-
trahend, the consequences are less dire when he fails to carry the 
burden of proof: the particular charge is deemed non-existent, 
leaving the rest of the subtrahend intact. If defendant had the 
164 Simons v. Ypsilanti Paper Co., 77 Mich. 185, 43 N.W. 864 (1889). 
165 See REsTATEMENT § 333, comment f. 
166 See text at note 24 supra. Courts that permit plaintiff recovery of reliance damages 
without reduction to reflect what he would have lost had he completed performance 
should, to be consistent, permit plaintiff at his option to treat the item as one of 
incidental damages. 
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burden, his failure to establish the non-existence of any item 
would have to be visited with valuing the entire subtrahend 
at zero.167 No Michigan case raises these problems. 
IV. "ENTITY" VALUATION 
A. "Entity" or "Components" Valuation? 
In the bulk of cases the court can avoid making this choice·.168 
Where plaintiff saved a single component, of course the component 
is the entity, and the two approaches are identical.169 Even when 
more than one component has been saved, the two approaches 
sometimes are the same. To explain this something must be said 
of the minor adjustments that must be made to the subtrahend 
when an "entity" approach is used. 
The "entity" approach assumes that plaintiff did or should 
have delivered to a resale purchaser some performance once sched-
uled for defendant. In the process of reselling plaintiff may incur 
charges in locating the resale purchaser, delivering the entity to 
him, storing or maintaining it or parts of it during the interval 
between breach notice and resale of the entity, etc. Breach may 
also permit the plaintiff to avoid incurring similar charges which 
he would have incurred had he completed his scheduled perform-
ance with defendant. Under a "components" approach, the ad-
justments to the subtrahend (or the incidental damages) are the 
additional charges involved in resale. However, under an "entity" 
approach, the adjustments (or incidental damages) are this sum 
minus similar charges saved by not completing performance with 
defendant. 
The "entity" and "components" approaches differ in their 
167 See text supra at 884-85. 
168 In only five cases did the Supreme Court face this choice: Demirjian v. Kurtis, 
353 Mich. 619, 91 N.W.2d 841 (1958); Harrington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 
166 Mich. 276, 131 N.W. 559 (1911); Petrie v: Lane, 58 Mich. 527, 25 N.W. 504 (1885); 
Hopkins v. Sanford, 41 Mich. 243, 2 N.W. 39 (1879); Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich. 239 
(1872). In Loud the argument for "entity" valuation was "faintly pressed." In Demirjian 
plaintiff contended that he should prevail in either event. In Hopkins the only question 
was one of burden of proof. In the other two cases the trial judge excluded evidence 
bearing on the propriety of "entity" valuation, so that in reversing the court did not 
have to make this choice but had to decide only that the choice should be explored 
more thoroughly below. In several other cases the facts presented this choice, but 
counsel failed to see it. E.g., Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 222 Mich. 95, 192 
N.W. 668 (1923); Mohr Hardware Co. v. Dubey, 136 Mich. 677, 100 N.W. 127 (1904); 
Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 (1888). 
100 E.g., St. John v. Richard, 272 Mich. 670, 262 N.W. 437 (1935); Goldsmith v. 
Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255, 200 N.W. 252 (1924); Gallino v. Boland, 221 Mich. 502, 191 
N.W. 222 (1922); Burrell v. New York & Saginaw Solar Salt Co., 14 Mich. 34 (1865). 
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adjustments (or incidental damages) because only the latter ap-
proach takes into account, as non-overhead items "yet to be in-
curred," the saved charges that would have been incurred had 
plaintiff completed performance with defendant. Since under 
an "entity" approach these saved charges cannot be taken into 
account in that fashion, they must be taken into account in the 
process of adjusting the subtrahend or in the process of comput-
ing incidental damages. Under an "entity" approach, for exam-
ple, the incidental damages or subtrahend adjustments are not 
the freight charges from Detroit to Milwaukee in our earlier fact 
situation. They are the difference between Detroit-Milwaukee and 
Detroit-Ypsilanti freight costs. 
Now it is possible to explain how "entity" and "components" 
approaches can be identical although more than one component 
was saved. This occurs where all the saved components are either 
(a) non-overhead "on hand" items, or (b) non-overhead "yet to 
be acquired" items which would be taken into account in adjust-
ing the subtrahend (or computing incidental damages) under an 
"entity" approach_17° Returning to the Ypsilanti-Detroit-Milwau-
kee situation, it can be seen that "entity" and "components" ap-
proaches are identical there. Under a "components" approach the 
saved components are the "on hand" :finished goods and the saved 
freight to Ypsilanti. The adjustment or the incidental damages is 
the freight to Milwaukee. Under an "entity" approach the entity 
is the "on hand" :finished goods, and the adjustment or incidental 
damages is the difference between freight to Milwaukee and freight 
to Ypsilanti. 
Even in those situations where the facts present an opportunity 
for a significant choice between approaches, the judges may avoid 
the necessity for choice if counsel are in agreement as to the ap-
proach to be taken. In one Michigan case171 where the choice 
between "entity" and "components" valuation might have been 
most difficult for the court to resolve, counsel were in agreement 
that a "components" approach should be used. Counsel did not 
see the formula which plaintiff proposed and as to which de-
fendant acquiesced in all major respects172 as involving "compo-
nents" valuation of the subtrahend, but upon analysis it turns out 
170 See note 164 supra. 
171 Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 222 Mich. 95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923). 
172 Defendant's only quarrel with plaintiff's proposed measure of damages concerned 
the timing of measuring the value of certain raw materials; defendant never urged 
an "entity" approach, which would have resulted in much larger recovery by plaintiff. 
See text infra at 897. 
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to be an algebraic equivalent of the approach sketched previously 
in this article. 
Plaintiff corporation, a manufacturer of artificial leather, 
sought expectation damages from buyer corporation, which had 
repudiated the contract before the goods were delivered. At the 
time of breach, plaintiff had completed the manufacture of, but 
had not delivered, 6,848 yards of goods, and another 46,464 yards 
remained to be manufactured. In order to manufacture these 
remaining 46,464 yards, plaintiff needed 46,464 yards of unfin-
ished cloth, and the other raw materials used in transforming such 
cloth into artificial leather. At about the same time as the plain-
tiff-defendant contract was formed, plaintiff contracted· with a 
cloth supplier for the cloth that was to be used in performing the 
defendant's order. The agreed price was I.IO dollars per yard. 
At the time when defendant breached, the cloth supplier had 
delivered to plaintiff some, but not all, of the cloth needed to 
complete manufacture of an additional 46,464 yards of finished 
product. The plaintiff had the power then to refuse further de-
liveries from this supplier, and such termination would not have 
exposed plaintiff to liability to the supplier inasmuch as the sup-
plier was at that time seriously in default in his performance. 
After defendant's repudiation plaintiff did not complete man-
ufacture of the 46,464 yards, nor did plaintiff resell the finished 
6,848 yards then on hand. Between the time when the plaintiff-
defendant contract was formed and the time when it was repu-
diated prices fell sharply in both the market in which plaintiff sold 
his finished product and the market in which plaintiff bought his 
raw materials. Cloth was selling for .32625 dollars per yard at 
the time of defendant's repudiation. 
Under a "components" approach, the minuend would be the 
unpaid balance of the price-104,846 dollars. The subtrahend 
would be the total of the value of all saved components. The 
saved 6,848 yards of finished goods (valued at actual resale value) 
were worth 2,602 dollars. The saved costs of transforming 46,464 
yards of unfinished cloth into artificial leather (dyeing, coating, 
labor, overhead, inspection) totalled 29,565 dollars. The saved 
cloth that would have been consumed in manufacturing another 
46,464 yards of artificial leather must be separated into two cate-
gories-"on hand" and "yet to be acquired" cloth. The "on hand" 
cloth should be valued at its actual resale value on the date of 
notice of breach-.32625 dollars per yard. The "yet to be ac-
quired" cloth should be valued at its cost of acquisition. If this 
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is determined as of the date when plaintiff first contracted with his 
supplier for it, this cloth should be valued at 1.10 dollars per 
yard; if the proper time for determination is the time of notice 
of breach, it should be valued at .32625 dollars per yard. 
Thus, if we assume that the "yet to be acquired" cloth should 
be valued by what it would have cost to acquire it at the time of 
notice of breach, it has the same value as the "on hand" cloth-
.32625 dollars per yard. (While the "on hand" cloth is valued at 
resale value and the "yet to be acquired" cloth is valued at ac-
quisition cost, these figures are in effect the same because plaintiff 
would acquire or resell this cloth in the same market.173) Assum-
ing that all the saved cloth is properly valued at .32625 dollars 
per yard, its value to plaintiff is 15,170 dollars. Still using this 
assumption, the total value of the components is 47,337 dollars 
and plaintiff's recovery would be 57,509 dollars. 
In the trial court plaintiff persuaded the judge to submit the 
case to the jury on a measurement formula which was actually an 
algebraic equivalent of the "components" approach, and which 
permitted a recovery of 57,512 dollars174 as sketched above. Plain-
tiff's theory gave him the sum of three items: 10,864 dollars for 
"loss on finished goods"; 7,309 dollars for "loss of profits on 46,464 
yards not made"; and 39,339 dollars for "loss on material for 46,464 
yards." Plaintiff's rationale for the three items was roughly this: 
the contract can be divided into two parts, one embracing the fin-
ished goods, and one embracing the unfinished goods. Plaintiff's 
first item of damages (10,864 dollars) reflected the first (finished 
goods) part of the contract. His other two items of damages re-
flected the unfinished goods part of the contract. As to these un-
finished goods he argued that he should recover "the difference 
between the amount it would cost him to make and deliver them, 
including the cost of the materials, and their contract price ... "m 
-his second item of 7,309 dollars. And, "if materials have been 
purchased with which to fulfill the contract, but no work has been 
bestowed upon them at the time of the breach [plaintiff argued, 
plaintiff should further recover] the difference between the cost 
173 If plaintiff would incur expense in accomplishing acquisition and/or resale of 
the cloth, the resale and costs values are not identical even though they are accomplished 
in the same market, because such expenses are added to the market price to give the 
adjusted cost of acquisition, but are subtracted from the market price to give the 
adjusted resale price. 
174 The $3 discrepancy between this figure and that in the prior paragraph is due 
to my rounding off fractions for simplicity. 
175 Brief for Plaintiff, p. 92, quoting Kingman v. Western Mfg. Co., 92 Fed. 486, 
490 (8th Cir. 1899). 
1963] THE SELLER'S DAMAGES 897 
and the market value of the materials that have been purchased 
at the time of the breach, if the market value be less than the 
cost"176-the third item of 39,339 dollars. 
Plaintiff did not attempt to justify the formula except by stat-
ing that it was first uttered in Judge Sanborn's "great leading 
case on the subject" (Kingman v. Western Mfg. Co.), and was 
approved in Sedgwick's treatise on damages.177 
The weakness of plaintiff's formula lay in the third item of 
39,339 dollars, which, according to Judge Sanborn's language, is 
recoverable only if "materials have been purchased with which 
to fulfill the contract." As defendant pointed out, in the trial 
court plaintiff had recovered in the third item for the cost/market 
difference of all materials that would have gone into an additional 
46,464 yards of artificial leather, although not all of these materials 
were on hand at the time of notice of breach. If the rationale un-
derlying the allowance of this third item is to permit plaintiff to 
recover for the loss he sustained when the resale value of raw 
materials that he purchased in reliance on the contract and had 
on hand at the time of breach declined, no recovery should be 
permitted for the decline in value of materials which plaintiff 
never purchased nor obligated himself irrevocably to purchase. 
On appeal the Michigan Supreme Court followed plaintiff's 
analysis of the situation, treating the three times separately. Plain-
tiff's recovery of the first two items was approved routinely, since 
they were uncontested on appeal.178 Turning then to the third 
item, the court sided with defendant: there was reversible error 
in permitting plaintiff to recover the cost/market spread of those 
raw materials which at the time of breach he neither had in his 
possession nor was obligated to accept and pay for. Since he could 
terminate his contract to accept further cloth with impunity, the 
mitigation notion required that he do so upon learning of de-
fendant's breach.179 
Had the case been presented in both courts as a straightforward 
suit for expectation damages with the subtrahend valued one com-
ponent at a time, the issue on appeal would have appeared differ-
ently. Then the issue would have been: in fixing the saved cost 
of acquiring the raw materials as yet undelivered at the time of 
breach, should they be valued as of the time when plaintiff orig-
176 Ibid. 
177 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES § 752 (9th ed. 1912). 
178 222 Mich. at 100-01, 192 N.W. at 670. 
179 Id. at 101-02, 192 N.W. at 670-71. 
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inally contracted with his supplier to pay I.IO dollars per yard 
for them, or as the date of breach, when plaintiff could have re-
pudiated his contract with his cloth supplier and purchased the 
cloth on the open market for .32625 dollars per yard? The su-
preme court's refusal to allow recovery of the part of the plain-
tiff's third item which represented the cost/market spread on raw 
materials that would have gone into plaintiff's performance but 
for breach, but which were yet to be acquired at the time of 
breach, had the identical economic effect as a decision to use the 
"components approach" would have had, valuing such materials 
at the earlier date, rather than at the later date, as was done by 
the trial court. 
The present object is not to get involved in a discussion of 
the appropriate time for valuing such components; the timing of 
valuation is a topic beyond the scope of this article. Rather, it is 
suggested that in this case the trial and appellate courts were using 
a "components" approach without knowing it, and counsel were 
similarly in agreement that "components" valuation should be 
attempted. 
Plaintiff's acquiescence in a "components" approach in this 
case, although an "entity" approach would give him greater re-
covery, may have been due to failure to appreciate the possible 
alternative, to doubts that he could persuade judge and jury to 
use an "entity" approach, or to the belief that section 64 of the 
Uniform Sales Act, which plaintiff quoted in his brief, 180 forbade 
greater recovery than that computed under a "components" ap-
proach. 
Section 64(4) of the Uniform Sales Act,181 in effect in Mich-
igan at the time the plaintiff-defendant contract was formed, 182 
addresses itself to the choice which plaintiff-manufacturer faces 
when his buyer repudiates before fabrication of the goods is com-
pleted. It is very clear that in no event can plaintiff recover 
180 Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 90-91. 
181 MICH. COMP. LAws § 440.64(4) (1948): "If, while labor or expense of material 
amount are necessary on the part of the seller to enable him to fulfill his obligations 
under the contract to sell or the sale, the buyer repudiates the contract or the sale, 
or notifies the seller to proceed no further therewith, the buyer shall be liable to the 
seller for no greater damages than the seller would have suffered if he did nothing 
toward carrying out the contract or the sale after receiving notice of the buyer's repu• 
diation or countermand. The profit the seller would have made if the contract or the 
sale had been fully performed, shall be considered in estimating such damages," 
Michigan's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.1101-
.9994 (Supp. 1962), will repeal the above provision, effective Jan. 1, 1964. 
182 The Uniform Sales Act was adopted in Michigan in 1913. 
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greater damages than those he would have sustained had he stopped 
work toward completion and resale of the goods upon notice of 
breach.183 But the draftsmen of the statute were much less clear 
as to just what damages plaintiff would have sustained had he 
stopped work upon notice of breach. The draftsmen's certainty 
returned in prescribing that the court should "consider" the plain-
tiff's lost profits (however they might be computed). But no di-
rection was given as to how to proceed after this period of con-
templation was concluded. 
Michigan has recently adopted the Uniform Commercial 
Code,184 but its provisions on this point, according to which the 
trial court is enjoined to depart from "entity" valuation of the 
subtrahend if that "measure of damages ... is inadequate to put 
the seller in as good a position as performance would have done," 
are almost equally as mysterious, 185 as the text of the statute con-
tains no clue as to when that measure is "inadequate." The com-
ment to section 2-708 mutters darkly about "fixed price articles," 
"standard priced goods," and "list price,"186 suggesting that the 
pricing practices of the plaintiff are determinative in some situa-
183 This seems to flout the general mitigation notions (1) that plaintiff need not take 
a certain post-breach course that would reduce damages if it would expose him to un• 
reasonable risk or loss or hardship, and (2) plaintiff's damages will not be reduced 
because in his efforts to choose a course of mitigation he selected one which, although 
apparently reasonable when selected, ultimately proved less frugal than some alternative 
course. 
184 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.1101-.9994 (Supp. 1962). 
185 UNIFORM Co111111ERCIAL CODE § 2-708, which reads: "Seller's Damages for Non-
acceptance or Repudiation. 
"(l) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this Article with respect to 
proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-acceptance or 
repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price at the time and 
place for tender and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental damages 
provided in this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses saved in consequence of the 
buyer's breach. 
"(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the 
seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the measure of dam-
ages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made 
from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental damages provided in 
this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit 
for payments or proceeds of resale." 
186 UNIFORM COlll!IIERCIAL CODE § 2-708, comment 2, which states: "The provision 
of this section permitting recovery of expected profit including reasonable overhead 
where the standard measure of damages is inadequate, together with the new require-
ment that price actions may be sustained only where resale is impractical, are designed 
to eliminate the unfair and economically wasteful results arising under the older law 
when fixed price articles were involved. This section permits the recovery of lost profits 
in all appropriate cases, which would include all standard priced goods. The normal 
measure there would be list price less cost to the dealer or list price less manufacturing 
cost to the manufacturer. It is not necessary to a recovery of 'profit' to show a history. 
of earnings, especially if a new venture is involved." 
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tions.187 In any event, when "entity" valuation of the subtrahend 
would give inadequate recovery, the proper measure under the 
UCC is "the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the 
seller would have made from full performance by the buyer, to-
gether with incidental damages ... , due allowance for costs rea-
sonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds from 
resale." How "reasonable overhead" gets included in "profit" is 
not explained. Nor is there any explanation of the meaning of 
the term "proceeds of resale" in a case, like that just discussed, 
where at the time of trial plaintiff resold neither the entity nor 
the saved "on hand" components. When a court is forced to a 
choice between "entity" and "components" valuation of the sub-
trahend, the ultimate question is this: in the light of the notions 
of mitigation and breach-caused gains, was plaintiff reasonable in 
his post-breach choice between (1) stopping all further work on 
the contract, and (2) completing work on the contract with an eye 
to resale of the entity to another buyer? 
If counsel frame the issue as a choice between "entity" and 
"components" valuation of the subtrahend,188 four basic fact situa-
tions can arise: (1) plaintiff completes work on the entity and at 
trial wants an "entity" approach to be adopted; (2) plaintiff stops 
further work and at trial wants a "components" approach to be 
taken; (3) plaintiff completes work and at trial wants a "compo-
nents" approach; (4) plaintiff abandons work and at trial wants 
an "entity" approach. 
In the first two situations, where plaintiff's choice of valuation 
technique corresponds with his post-breach course of action, the 
court should accept plaintiff's approach to valuation unless (a) 
187 The language savors of English decisions involving car dealers. See Thompson 
v. Robinson, [1955] 2 Weekly L.R. 185. These have been criticized by Professor Marshall 
on the grounds that parties should not be able to bootstrap themselves out of the 
normal measure of damages by arguing their own restrictive marketing practices. Com• 
ment, 34 CAN. B. REv. 969, 971 (1956). 
188 Usually the issue is not framed by counsel in this manner. Plaintiff will typically 
argue for a "components" approach by saying he is entitled to "lost profits." E.g., Cal-
lender v. Myers Regulator Co., 250 Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930); Atkinson v. Morse, 
63 Mich. 276, 29 N.W. 711 (1886); Goodrich v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 62, 16 N.W. 232 (1883). 
Defendant may not counter by arguing for an "entity" approach, but by arguing that 
plaintiff is not among the class entitled to "lost profits." E.g., Hamilton v. Stephens, 240 
Mich. 228, 215 N.W. 321 (1927); Mohr Hardware Co. v. Dubey, 136 Mich. 677, 100 N.W. 
127 (1904); Goodrich v. Hubbard, supra. Or that the "lost profits" are "speculative." 
E.g., Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co. v. Plywood Prods. Corp., 311 Mich. 226, 18 
N.W.2d 387 (1945); Barrett v. Grand Rapids Veneer Works, 110 Mich. 6, 67 N.W. 976 
(1896); Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 (1888). Or that some items are 
not proved with certainty. E.g., Moline Furniture ,vorks v. Club Holding Co., 280 Mich. 
587, 274 N.W. 338 (1937); Callender v. Myers Regulator Co., supra; Detroit Fireproofing 
Tile Co. v. Vinton Co., 190 Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916). 
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plaintiff should have known at the time he made the choice that 
it would enhance damages and (b) it would not require undue 
risk or self-sacrifice for plaintiff to take the opposite course. De-
fendant should have the burden of showing that plaintiff's choice 
violated mitigation notions because in the frequently-encountered 
"no proof" situation the probability is that plaintiff's choice ac-
cords with mitigation notions. This is true because plaintiff's self-
interest normally leads him to mitigate damages; it is the rare 
plaintiff who is so sure of a future victory in court that he is will-
ing to incur unnecessary expense after breach in order to increase 
the size of his future judgment. 
In the last two of the four situations, where plaintiff's choice 
of valuation technique runs counter to his post-breach course of 
conduct, the court should side with defendant. Defendant's pref-
erence for a technique that coincides with what plaintiff actually 
did rests on defendant's belief that that valuation technique will 
result in lower damage recovery. The mitigation notion and the 
notion of breach-caused gains favor such a valution technique. 
Plaintiff's only possible counter-argument is the fallacious asser-
tion that since mitigation notions did not require him to take the 
post-breach course he took, in valuation, that course should be 
disregarded. The fallacy lies in overlooking the notion that breach-
caused gains, even though resulting from gambles not required by 
the mitigation notion, must be taken into account.189 
The first of these four situations (plaintiff completed work and 
wanted to use an "entity" approach, but defendant wanted a "com-
ponents" approach) has not arisen in Michigan. The closest case 
involved a plaintiff who published a trade journal in which an 
ad was to be run weekly for a year, plaintiff seeking damages when 
defendant repudiated before the end of the year.190 Defendant 
made a feeble effort at trial to establish that plaintiff would sustain 
no damages if the subtrahend was valued by components saved,191 
but the effort was abandoned by the time the case reached the 
supreme court. There both parties were agreed upon the use of 
an "entity" approach. 
The second situation (plaintiff abandons work and wants a 
"components" approach at trial, but defendant wants an "entity" 
approach) arose in Loud v. Campbe[l.1!!2 Plaintiff, owner of a ship, 
189 See text supra at 850, 859. 
1no Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., 147 Mich. 702, lll N.W. 343 (1907). 
101 Record, p. 26, Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., supra note 190. 
rn2 26 Mich. 239 (1872). 
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contracted to load the vessel with defendant's lumber at Au Sable 
and carry the cargo to Buffalo. Defendant's breach occurred when 
the ship was lying off Au Sable, before the lumber was loaded. 
Plaintiff, unable. to berth at Au Sable because of weather condi-
tions, thereupon abandoned all plans for a voyage from Au Sable 
to Buffalo, ordering the vessel to return to its home port, Detroit. 
Plaintiff sought to value the subtrahend by including the various 
saved components-the costs yet to be incurred in the voyage from 
Au Sable to Buffalo. Defendant sought to value the entity-car-
riage of a shipload of lumber from Au Sable to Buffalo. The court 
rejected defendant's argument (which was only "faintly pressed"),1°3 
apparently because the weather conditions made it unreasonable 
to demand that plaintiff seek to resell the entity by finding another 
lumber dealer at Au Sable interested in carriage of a shipload of 
lumber to Buffalo. 
It arose again in Hopkins v. Sanford194 where plaintiff sawmill 
owner, who had failed to resell the entity (part of his mill's services 
for the season), sought a "components" approach and defendant 
argued for an "entity" approach. Neither party offered evidence 
that plaintiff could have found a new purchaser for the entity had 
he sought one late in the season, the time of the breach. The trial 
judge charged that defendant had the burden of showing that 
plaintiff could have resold the entity, and this was held proper on 
appeal. This accords with the notion that where plaintiff picks 
one course of action and defendant seeks to use a valuation ap-
proach predicated on another course, defendant has the burden of 
proving the feasibility of that other course. 
The third situation (plaintiff abandoned further work toward 
completing the entity and wanted "entity" valuation, defendant 
wanting "components" valuation) has not reached the Michigan 
Supreme Court. Demirjian v. Kurtis,195 involving a complex var-
iant on the situation, is discussed subsequently.100 
The fourth situation' (plaintiff completes performance but 
wants "components" approach at trial, defendant wanting "entity" 
approach) has arisen twice in Michigan. In Harrington-Wiard Co. 
v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co.,197 plaintiff was a manufacturer of engines 
who contracted to furnish a specified number of them to defendant, 
193 Id. at 244. 
194 41 Mich. 243, 2 N.W. 39 (1879). 
195 353 Mich. 619, 91 N.W .2d 841 (1958). 
196 See text at note 230 infra. 
101 166 Mich. 276, 131 N.W. 559 (1911). 
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a manufacturer of automobiles. Performance of the contract would 
have utilized almost the entire productive capacity of plaintiff's 
plant for a substantial length of time, so the "entity" could be re-
garded as that capacity for that time. At trial plaintiff sought to 
use a "components" approach, proving the value of the various 
items that would have gone into his promised performance. The 
trial judge prevented defense counsel from introducing evidence 
to the effect that after breach plaintiff had resold almost the entire 
productive capacity of his plant to another car manufacturer, 
promising to make similar engines for him. The exclusion of this 
evidence was deemed reversible error by the supreme court, its 
underlying logic undoubtedly being that a "components" approach 
would be inappropriate if plaintiff had in fact resold the entity after 
breach and defendant wanted "entity" valuation. The court did 
not elaborate on its reasons, however. 
A comparable situation arose in the first Petrie v. Lane,198 in-
volving a plaintiff selling the services of his lumber mill to de-
fendant, owner of a large number of logs. Cutting defendant's 
logs would have fully occupied plaintiff's productive capacity dur-
ing that year's milling season. Plaintiff sought to use a "compo-
nents" approach, and was successful in the trial court. The trial 
judge excluded defendant's evidence that plaintiff had resold the 
entity-his mill's capacity for the season. The court reversed, on 
this ground as well as others. 
In all four cases-Loud, Hopkins, Harrington-Wiard, and 
Petrie, the court reached results that accord with the views ex-
pressed here. 
B. Valuing the Entity in the Absence of Lost Volume Problems 
If the entity consists of real property other than a short-term 
lease,100 the entity should be valued at hypothetical resale value. 
Otherwise, it should be valued at actual resale value.200 
If the entity consists of plaintiff's own non-overhead services, 
the burden of proving its value should be cast on defendant. 
Othenvise, the burden should be on plaintiff.201 
Adjustments to reduce the subtrahend202 should be proved by 
ms 58 Mich. 527, 25 N.W. 504 (1885). 
100 Regarding short-term leases, see note 141 supra, and text supra at 888. 
200 The valuation rules here suggested parallel the valuation rules earlier suggested 
for various categories of components. The rationale, which would be repetitious, is 
omitted. 
201 The burden of proof rules here parallel those for "components" valuation. See 
text at note 157 supra. 
20:i See text supra at 861. 
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plaintiff; adjustments to increase it203 by defendant,204 whether or 
not plaintiff in fact resells the entity before trial. 
The Michigan case law concerning the valuation techniques 
and burden of proving the value of the entity accords with the 
views presented here,205 with a single possibly discrepant case.200 
Plaintiff there was a trade journal which had contracted to 
run defendant's ad weekly for a year on the journal's inside cover. 
Defendant agreed to pay at the rate of fifty-five cents per inch. 
Before the middle of the year defendant repudiated. Plaintiff at-
tempted with no success to find another purchaser on the same 
terms: the same part of the cover, one year, fifty-five cents per 
inch. He refused to cut the rate in order to attract another cus-
tomer. Throughout this period plaintiff was selling less desirable 
space on the inside pages of his journal at the rate of forty cents 
per inch, and after defendant's breach plaintiff published some 
of the ads of his "inside page" customers on the cover, receiving 
no additional compensation from them for this improved position. 
Had plaintiff filled the entire inside cover with ads at forty cents 
per inch, his gross receipts from such advertisers would have been 
336 dollars. His gross receipts from the advertisers whose ads he 
actually moved to the inside cover were 326.26 dollars. 
Plaintiff succeeded in the trial court in having the subtrahend 
valued at the gross receipts from "inside page" advertisers whose 
ads were moved to the cover-326.26 dollars. At trial and on ap-
peal defendant argued that plaintiff could have received more 
than that sum for the breach-released cover space, had he been 
willing to cut the price for cover space from fifty-five cents, or 
had he been willing to sell the cover space in small bits, instead 
of as a single ad, or had he been willing to sell the space to one pur-
chaser for less than a year. The supreme court affirmed the find-
ings and the conclusions of the trial judge who had sat without a 
jury. The court remarked, "The burden of proof is on the party 
203 If plaintiff saved larger incidental charges for freight, storage, etc., than the inci-
dental charges for finding the repurchaser, freight to him, storage, etc., defendant should 
be permitted to increase the subtrahend by the amount of such difference. 
204 Compare text supra at 861. 
205 In none of the cases where "entity" and "components" approaches differ did the 
court reach a question of choice of technique for valuing the entity. In cases where 
"entity" and "components" approaches are identical there is harmony between these 
views of valuation techniques and the Michigan results. See, e.g., Raycraft v. Northville-
Six Mile Co., 358 Mich. 466, 100 N.W .2d 223 (1960); St. John v. Richard, 272 Mich. 670, 
262 N.W. 437 (1935); Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 225, 200 N.W. 252 (1924); Gallina 
v. Boland, 221 Mich. 502, 191 N.W. 222 (1922); Burrell v. New York & Saginaw Solar 
Salt Co., 14 Mich. 34 (1865). 
206 Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., 147 Mich. 702, Ill N.W. 343 (19~7). 
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wrongfully repudiating the contract to show to what extent the 
damages were lessened or might have been lessened [ citing four 
cases]. "207 
As I analyze the case, "entity" valuation of the subtrahend was 
adopted by both counsel and both courts, the entity being the 
space on the cover which defendant's ad would have occupied. 
Since the entity was not realty, its actual resale value should fix 
the subtrahend. Since the entity did not consist solely of plaintiff's 
own non-overhead services "on hand," plaintiff should have had 
the burden of showing the actual resale value of the space. A mere 
showing of his gross receipts would not carry the burden, since 
they might be less than a reasonable man would have garnered. 
But plaintiff established at least a prima facie case that his gross 
receipts were as high as a reasonable man's would have been, since 
he introduced testimony as to his unsuccessful efforts to resell the 
space on the same terms as those on which it had been sold to 
defendant and further testimony that those were his customary 
terms. 
Defendant's efforts to break down this prima facie case rested 
on two arguments: (I) that plaintiff should have departed from his 
customary terms for cover space, and (2) that plaintiff should have 
filled all the space, not merely the bulk of it, with transferred 
"inside page" ads. The court apparently rejected the latter argu-
ment because the adjustment in recovery which it would effect 
(less than 10 dollars) was de minimis. Its opinion on motion for 
rehearing indicates that it rejected the former argument because 
"the plaintiff was under no legal obligation to split up the time 
or space covered by the contract .... "208 In other words, mitiga-
tion notions did not compel him to depart from his customary 
terms of sale.200 
So viewed, the case is consistent with the notions of burden 
of proof expressed here. By its remark that defendant had the 
burden of proof, the court, according to this view, meant only 
that defendant had the onus of rebutting plaintiff's prima facie 
case as to the value of the entity. It did not mean that the result 
would have been the same had plaintiff failed to introduce any 
evidence of the value of the saved entity. 
But the four cases cited by the court in support of its position 
201 147 Mich. at 706, lll N.W. at 344. 
208 Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., supra note 206, rehearing denied, 147 Mich. 
706, 708, ll2 N.W. 708, 709 (1907). 
200 Cf. Annot., 35 A.L.R. 1536 (1925). See generally Annots., 46 A.L.R. ll92, ll94 
(1927): 1 A.L.R. 436 (1919). 
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led to a different reading of the case. One was too far from the 
point to shed much light.210 But two others211 involved the burden 
of proving the value of plaintiff's own non-overhead services "on 
hand." In such cases defendant has the "burden" of proving the 
value of the subtrahend in the fullest sense: if neither party offers 
any evidence of its value, the court gives it a zero value and allows 
plaintiff the equivalent of a price recovery. The citation of these 
cases suggests that the court recognized no distinction in the allo-
cation of the burden between such cases and others, or, at least, 
that i~ regarded the trade journal plaintiff in this plight as some-
how akin to the plaintiff-employee. The fourth case cited stresses 
this kinship, although in a different context.212 
The court's result accords with the views urged here; its dic-
tum, however, is inconsistent when read in the light of the cases 
cited. 
C. The Problem of Lost Volume 
Sometimes, when plaintiff resells the entity once destined for 
defendant to a new buyer, X, plaintiff thereby deprives himself of 
something of value-sale of another similar entity to X. Had there 
been no breach and consequently no resale, plaintiff would have 
sold two similar entities-one to defendant and one to X. The 
breach and resale have reduced plaintiff's total volume of sales 
by the quantity that was resold to X.213 
210 Hopkins v. Sanford, 41 Mich. 243, 2 N.W. 39 (1879). See text at note 194 supra. 
In Hopkins and the case at bar the issue was the burden of proving what a reasonable 
man would have garnered by resale of the entity. But in Hopkins the question arose 
as a choice between "entity" and "components" approaches where the two would give 
different results and plaintiff had taken a post-breach course consistent with "components" 
valuation. In the trade journal case the question arose in the course of deciding whether 
the actual resale value of the entity was higher than the gross receipts that plaintiff 
garnered by resale, plaintiff having conceded that "entity" valuation was appropriate. 
Had plaintiff failed to make this concession and had there been no evidence of a resale 
of the space released by breach, the cases would have presented the same problem. 
211 See Carver v. School Dist., 113 Mich. 524, 71 N.W. 859 (1897); Farrell v. School 
Dist., 98 Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053 (1893). 
212 Peck &: Co. v. Kansas City Metal Roofing &: Corrugating Co., 96 Mo. App. 212 
(1902). There the trade journal plaintiff, upon defendant advertiser's breach, continued 
to run his ad for the balance of the term and collected the whole price in the trial 
court. The appellate court reversed on the ground that plaintiff was required to miti-
gate by ceasing to run the ad after defendant's repudiation, and went on to decide 
whether "entity" or "components" valuation of the subtrahend was proper. Contrasting 
its plaintiff-employee cases ("entity''), with its plaintiff-builder cases ("components''), it con-
cluded that the instant case "more nearly resembles the former than it docs the latter 
kind of contracts." 96 Mo. App. at 218. No issue of burden of proof was involved. 
213 See I BoNBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 304 (1937); 5 CORBIN § 1100, at 449; 
McCORMICK § 41; Beale, Damages Upon Repudiation of a Contract, 17 YALE L.J. 443, 
455 (1908); Waters, The Concept of Market in the Sale of Goods, 36 CAN. B. REv. 360 
(1958); Comment, 34 CAN. B. REv. 969 (1956); Note, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 581 (1937); Com-
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Where there in· fact has been a resale of the entity prior to 
the trial,214 with attendant lost volume, the value of the lost volume 
can be taken into account in either of two ways: (1) by adjusting 
the value of the subtrahend to reflect it, or (2) by treating the 
lost volume as an item of incidental damages. Where there has 
been no such resale before trial, but damages are being computed 
as if plaintiff had made such a resale, the value of the lost volume 
should be taken into account as an adjustment of the subtrahend. 
The subtrahend (actual resale value of the entity) should be re-
duced by the value to plaintiff of the lost volume. As will be 
shown shortly, its value is the profit he would have made on such 
an additional sale. 
To take a simplified example, if plaintiff is a car retailer who 
sells all his cars of a certain model at 3,000 dollars, and defendant-
customer repudiates his contract to purchase one, and resale would 
be attended by lost volume, the minuend is the unpaid balance of 
the price-3,000 dollars if defendant has paid nothing. The sub-
trahend is the resale value of the entity (3,000 dollars), reduced by 
the profit plaintiff would have made on the lost sale-hypotheti-
cally 500 dollars. Deducting the adjusted subtrahend, 2,500 dollars, 
from the minuend, 3,000 dollars, plaintiff should recover 500 dol-
lars plus any incidental expenses. In this particular instance his 
recovery is identical with the profit he would have enjoyed on 
the contract with defendant had there been no breach, but, as 
will be shown, this is not always the case. 
D. J,Vhen Does Resale of the Entity "Cost" Plaintiff 
the Sale of Another Similar Entity? 
If the plaintiff resold or should have resold the entity once 
promised to defendant and four conditions are met, the resale215 
of that entity to that buyer has an invisible cost to plaintiff: loss 
of the sale of other wares to that buyer.216 This will be true only 
if: (I) the person who bought the resold entity217 would have been 
ment, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 993 (1956); Annots., 24 A.L.R.2d 1008 (1952); 120 A.L.R. II92 
(1939); 44 A.L.R. 349 (1926). 
214 In the prior article, I discussed the lost volume problem in the context of valuing 
"on hand" personalty, and made passing reference to its impact on "entity" valuation. 
It arises only when the "entity" valuation is used, although in many such cases "entity" 
and "components" approaches give identical results. It seems more easily handled by an 
"entity" analysis. 
215 "Resale" is used hereafter to include both a factual resale and the putative resale 
used as a reference point when the entity's resale value fixes the subtrahend, although 
in fact plaintiff failed to resell. 
216 Cf. REsrATEMENT § 336, illustrations 6, 7. 
217 If plaintiff in fact resold before trial a specified entity scheduled for defendant, 
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solicited by plaintiff to buy other wares had there been no breach 
and resale; (2) the solicitation would have been successful; (3) 
the plaintiff could have performed that additional contract; and 
(4) solely because he purchased the resold entity, that buyer now 
is unwilling to buy other wares from plaintiff. Some amplification 
is in order. 
The notion that "the person who bought the resold entity 
would have been solicited by plaintiff to buy other wares had 
there been no breach and resale" can be broken down into two 
aspects. One pertains to the likelihood that plaintiff would have 
solicited someone to buy other wares at all. If plaintiff is not a 
commercial seller, absent other evidence, he probably would not 
have solicited anyone.218 If he is a commercial seller, absent other 
facts, he probably would have attempted other sales. However, 
even if plaintiff is a commercial seller, if he had decided to go 
out of business prior to the time of receiving notice of defendant's 
breach,219 he would not have solicited anyone to buy other wares. 
Even if plaintiff is a commercial seller who had no plans to go 
out of business, if prior to notice of breach he had reached the 
limits of the volume he planned to sell,220 he would not have so-
licited further orders. 
Plaintiff may have reached his limit of volume because he 
could not handle more business without expansion of his plant 
or drastic revision of his mode of doing business, neither of which 
he intended to undertake. If at notice of breach plaintiff was han-
dling as great a volume as he could accommodate without plant 
expansion or drastic revision of his operations,221 the court should 
this resale purchaser can be identified at the trial. Otherwise he is a putative person, 
used as a reference point in valuation. In the latter event his "behavior" had he not 
"bought" the "resold" entity can be known only through inferences drawn from the 
original contract with defendant and the general nature of plaintiff's business. In the 
former event evidence about his particular plans and wants should be admitted. 
218 Unless there is affirmative evidence that plaintiff would have attempted other 
sales, the plaintiff-seller who is not in the business of selling such wares as he contracted 
to sell defendant should not get a lost volume adjustment. 
219 See discussion of the Demirjian case in the text infra at 911-13. 
220 Plaintiff's substantial expenditures on non-institutional advertising and promotion 
at the time of receiving notice of breach is strong evidence that he had not reached the 
limits of the volume that he planned to sell. 
221 In several cases court and counsel appeared to ignore possible adjustment for lost 
volume for this reason. E.g., Harrington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 166 Mich. 
276, 131 N.W. 559 (1911) (plant filled to capacity by substitute contract); Tradesman Co. 
v. Superior Mfg. Co., 147 Mich. 70~, 111 N.W. 343 ~1907) (limited supply of cover space 
apparently already exhausted); Petne v. Lane, 58 Mich. 527, 25 N.W. 504 (1885) (sawmill 
of limited capacity); Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich. 239 (1872) (boat fully loaded). In some 
cases, however, it was ignored although plaintiff's capacity was still expansible. E.g., 
Hopkins v. Sanford, 41 Mich. 243, 2 N.W. 39 (1879). 
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presume that he did not intend to solicit another order. Of course, 
the presumption should be rebuttable upon the introduction of 
evidence that plaintiff in fact planned such expansion or revi-
sion.222 
The other aspect of this first condition concerns the identity 
of the person whose business plaintiff intended to solicit. If he 
would not have solicited the person who purchased the resold 
entity, the first condition is not met. For example, if plaintiff 
resold the entity once headed for defendant in a market in which 
plaintiff did not ordinarily operate,223 the probabilities are that 
the resale purchaser, found in that market, was not someone whom 
plaintiff otherwise would have solicited.224 
The second condition is that the resale purchaser, had he been 
solicited by plaintiff absent breach and resale, would have agreed 
to purchase other wares from him. Normally,225 this is evidentially 
supported by the fact that the purchaser took the resale entity 
from plaintiff, suggesting that if he had not taken this entity from 
plaintiff he would have taken another like one from him. The 
evidence has probative value where the resold entity is in no 
significant way different from the other wares plaintiff claims he 
would have sold to the resale purchaser but for defendant's breach. 
If the purchaser took one entity of fungibles, the odds are high 
that he would have taken another entity of fungibles instead. 
Once we depart from fungibles, however, the problem gets 
harder. If the wares plaintiff claims he otherwise would have sold 
this purchaser differ in some respect from the resold entity, the 
question arises: had the resale purchaser been offered not the entity 
rejected by defendant, but those other wares of plaintiff most sim-
ilar to that entity, would he have bought these other wares from 
222 See discussion of the Petrie case in the text infra at 911. 
223 "Proof" problems become most difficult where defendant claims that the reduc-
tion in price which plaintiff gave the resale purchaser amounted to resale in such a 
market, all other aspects of the sale being indistinguishable from plaintiff's ordinary 
sales. Probably it is just a question of degree; a big reduction below the prices plaintiff 
customarily gives arguably represents entry into another market. 
224 If it appears that plaintiff resold the entity in an unusual market to avoid losing 
volume by a resale in his usual market, the court should presume that this decision 
accords with mitigation notions. However, defendant should be permitted to rebut the 
presumption by showing that plaintiff (a) should have known resale in his regular market 
would reduce damages further, even with adjustment for lost volume, and (b) resale in 
his regular market would not have entailed more risk or self-sacrifice than the mitigation 
notions require. Absent such rebuttal, the actual resale value of the entity in the 
unusual market should fix the subtrahend, with no adjustment for lost volume. 
221> Where the resale purchaser is identified at trial, this condition can be established 
by other lines of proof. But the fact that the other wares of plaintiff all differ sub-
stantially from the resold entity should still be evidence that the condition was not met. 
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plaintiff, refrained from any purchase of such wares, or purchased 
from another seller wares which were more like the entity rejected 
by defendant? 
The car retailer situation furnishes an illustration. If defend-
ant refused to accept a 1963 Chevrolet of a certain color and model, 
and it was resold to X, and plaintiff is the only Chevrolet dealer 
accessible to X, it is probable that plaintiff could have sold X 
another 1963 Chevrolet of that model and color had X not bought 
the car rejected by defendant. But if plaintiff could not have ob-
tained another Chevrolet of that color and model, and another 
Chevrolet dealer accessible to X could have done so, it is less likely 
that X would have bought a different car from plaintiff had he not 
bought the car rejected by defendant. Assuming for the moment 
that price and other terms would be identical, and servicing would 
be the same, it is more likely that X would have purchased his car 
from the other Chevrolet dealer. Of course, if X is identified, 
there may be other evidence offered to show that he would have 
preferred to deal with plaintiff rather than another dealer even if 
this meant buying a different model or color. But absent such 
other evidence, there is no probability that this second condition 
is met. 
The third condition concerns plaintiff's ability to have per-
formed such a contract with X, had it been made. If it is shown 
that plaintiff lacked the physical ability to perform such a con-
tract, no volume has been lost because of breach and resale that 
would not have been lost even without breach and resale.226 
The last condition pertains to the limits on the resale pur-
chaser's wants and financial means. If his purchase of the wares 
that defendant rejected does not reduce X's desire or ability to 
purchase other wares plaintiff wants to sell, plaintiff's volume has 
not been impaired by the resale. For example, if defendant has 
a standing offer to purchase all of a certain type of commodity 
which plaintiff can acquire, resale of some of that commodity 
to the resale purchaser does not prevent plaintiff from selling more 
of it later to X. The purchaser's demands for more of it later are 
undiminished by the resale of the entity defendant rejected.227 
In only two cases which have reached the Michigan Supreme 
220 Often the non-fulfillment of this condition is the easiest way to defeat a lost 
volume adjustment. E.g., Charter v. Sullivan, [1957] 2 Q.B. 117. See discussion of the 
Petrie case infra at 911. 
227 Similarly if X is a wealthy collector of items such as the resold entity, his resale 
purchase may not reduce his interest in later purchases from plaintiff. 
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Court have plaintiffs apparently argued for valuation of the sub-
trahend by an "entity" approach with adjustment to reflect the 
lost volume attendant upon resale. In the second Petrie case228 
plaintiff was a sawmill operator who contracted to cut defendant's 
timber into boards. Defendant repudiated before performance 
began. Plaintiff found other customers and kept the mill going 
during the entire milling season doing their work. Plaintiff sought 
to recover "lost profits," so his theory was either (a) that he should 
be allowed a "components" approach, or (b) that he should be 
allowed an "entity" approach with adjustment for lost volume. 
The trial judge directed a verdict for defendant after plaintiff's 
opening statement, and this was affirmed on appeal. On petition 
for rehearing by the Michigan Supreme Court plaintiff argued, in 
effect, that an "entity" approach with adjustment for lost volume 
was appropriate, since resale of the entity (the mill's normal pro-
ductive capacity for the season) deprived him of what otherwise 
would have been his larger volume of his sales. He tried to coun-
ter the argument that he could not handle defendant's contract 
as well as another by asserting that he could have operated his 
mill day and night. The petition for rehearing was denied on 
the ground that plaintiff failed to allege his ability to operate day 
and night.229 This would suggest that the court would not be 
adverse to allowing an adjustment for lost volume in appropriate 
cases, but that in this case plaintiff lacked the intent to sell any 
other wares-the first condition. There may have been a feeling, 
too, that he lacked the physical ability to operate the mill day 
and night-the third condition. 
In the Demirjian case230 plaintiff apparently oscillated between 
a "components" approach and an "entity" approach with adjust-
ment for lost volume, and it is most difficult to tell on which 
theory the court affirmed plaintiff's trial court judgment. There 
plaintiff was a commercial lessor of juke boxes who had agreed 
to furnish defendant with a box for three years, to change the 
records in it from time to time, and to keep it in repair. When 
defendant repudiated the contract shortly after its commencement, 
plaintiff repossessed the machine and sued for expectation dam-
ages. Shortly thereafter plaintiff went out of business, liquidating 
this machine along with the rest of his enterprise. Apparently, in 
228 Petrie v. Lane, 67 Mich. 454, 35 N.W. 70 (1887). 
229 The court later properly retreated from this apparent endorsement of the reso-
lution of such problems on the pleadings. See Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 322, 
36 N.W. 88, 93 (1888). 
2so Demirjian v. Kurtis, 353 Mich. 619, 91 N.W.2d 841 (1958). 
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the brief time between repossession and liquidation, he did not 
arrange for another long-term lease of this machine, but put it 
at some other location where his weekly receipts from it were less 
than his costs of doing business.231 
In the trial court plaintiff computed damages as if the mitiga-
tion notion required him to re-let the machine on identical terms 
to those given defendant, and as if such re-letting deprived him 
of still another lease of another machine.232 By the time plaintiff 
filed his brief with the circuit court, however, he had modified his 
theory. Now he was claiming, as well, that upon breach the miti-
gation notion permitted him to liquidate his business rather than 
re-letting the machine for another three years.233 His damage 
measurement figures, with a single exception,234 were equally ap-
plicable to the new theory as well as to the old.235 The single 
exception worked in defendant's favor.236 The circuit court af-
firmed plaintiff's judgment without shedding much light on its 
rationale.237 On further appeal to the supreme court plaintiff 
231 Record, pp. 40(a)-4l(a). 
232 Plaintiff's theory was that he should recover the contract price, $3,120, less the 
following: depreciation over three years, cost of new records, cost of repair parts and 
service, and interest on the purchase price of $165. He explained the last item thus: 
"I estimated, that if the machine was taken out and could be placed somewhere else 
that would save •.. the lessor from buying a new machine to put someplace else. The 
new machine [would] cost eleven hundred dollars. Therefore, he would save the interest 
on that . • .• Therefore, I knocked off an additional one-hundred-seventy-five dollars 
for five per cent interest at three years." Record, pp. 38(a)-39(a). (The $175 figure was 
later corrected to $165.) 
His computation was co1Tect if "entity" valuation was being used with adjustment to 
reflect lost volume, and if the unadjusted actual resale value of the entity was $3,120, 
as he assumed. The minuend would be $3,120. The unadjusted subtrahend would be 
the same. The adjustment would be the profit plaintiff would have made had he let 
another juke box to X-the person to whom plaintiff should have re-let the box that 
was repossessed. The lost profit on that "lost lease" of another machine would have 
been $3,120 less the cost of items proved by plaintiff. The $165 item was properly included 
as a variable cost that would have been incurred to perform that lost lease. Neither 
counsel pressed the question of saved overhead after cross-examination of plaintiff showed 
it to be of negligible size. 
233 Record, p. 90(a). 
234 The $165 item was inappropriate when plaintiff switched his theory. Under a 
"components" approach the costs of another lease are irrelevant. And the interest charges 
incurred before breach in order to perform for defendant are irrelevant, since not saved 
because of the breach. 
235 Under a "components" approach plaintiff saved (1) three years' use of the machine, 
which is reflected in the earlier "depreciation" item; (2) the "yet to be acquired" non-
overhead items involving record replacement and repairs-all reflected in the figures in 
the record. 
236 Plaintiff magnanimously waived the $165 item when he switched theories. He 
did not mention the fact that he was switching, in either his circuit court or supreme 
court brief. 
237 "Plaintiff • • • is suing for his expectation interest, the profit he would have 
enjoyed had not defendant breached the contract. To determine this amount it is 
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again straddled both theories-"components" valuation and "en-
tity" valuation with adjustment for lost volume.238 His victory 
produced no further judicial illumination; the supreme court 
affirmed on the opinion below without additional comments. 
While the case can be read as a judicial endorsement of the 
"entity" approach with adjustment for lost volume, it seems better 
to read it as but another example of the "components" approach. 
Mitigation notions permitted plaintiff to stop further work toward 
resale (re-letting) of the entity, and he never did resell the entity; 
thus a "components" approach is in order. An "entity" approach 
with adjustment for lost volume would seem inappropriate inas-
much as plaintiff went out of business shortly after breach, sug-
gesting that even without the breach he would not have been 
trying to arrange for additional leases. (There was nothing in 
the record to indicate that plaintiff's decision to go out of busi-
ness could be attributed to defendant's breach.) 
In Mohr Hardware Co. v. Dubey239 plaintiff did not argue that 
entity resale would impair his total volume, but did seek to mea-
sure damages in a fashion that would be justifiable only according 
to such a theory. The rationale he presented for his measure, 
however, was clearly fallacious.240 The court reversed the plain-
tiff's judgment, in effect valuing the subtrahend by the actual 
resale value of the entity without adjustment for the value of the 
lost volume. Since neither counsel nor the court considered the 
possibilities of volume being impaired,241 the case would not seem 
necessary to subtract plaintiff's expenses from the consideration he would have received 
from defendant." 353 Mich. at 622, 91 N.W.2d at 843. 
238 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 10, 15. Plaintiff did not view his second theory 
as "entity valuation with adjustment for lost volume." Rather, he saw it as involving a 
rule of this sort: where plaintiff has sufficient space and personnel to handle, at once, 
his contract with defendant and another similar contract made by plaintiff with X after 
defendant's breach, plaintiff's recovery against defendant should not be reduced by the 
profits plaintiff made on his contract with X, because these profits were not caused by 
defendant's breach. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 11. 
2so 136 Mich. 677, 100 N.W. 127 (1904). 
240 Plaintiff argued: (1) the measure is the difference between contract price and 
market price; (2) the only evidence of market price was his testimony about the whole-
sale market in which he had purchased the goods; and (3) therefore, the subtrahend should 
be the wholesale price of the goods. The fallacy lies in the facts that (a) the formula 
means resale market (actual resale value), not the market in which plaintiff purchased 
(cost value), and (b) since plaintiff has the burden of proving actual resale value, his 
failure to prove the right market results in his defeat, not the substitution of the value 
be proved in the wrong market. The court so held. 
Since he was a list-price seller it was possible to infer the actual resale value of the 
goods: it would be identical to the contract price. Plaintiff did not want to stress this 
because, unless an adjustment for lost volume was possible, it would lead to identical 
minuend and subtrahend and no recovery. The court so held. 
241 Defendant and the court distinguished cases in which the plaintiff-seller recov-
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to indicate that the court would reject such an argument were it 
put forward.242 
E. "Components" Approach Compared With "Entity" Approach 
With Adjustment for Lost Volume 
Counsel and the court often refer to the "components" ap-
proach by describing it as a formula which permits plaintiff-seller 
to recover his "lost profits." This is dangerous terminology. In 
some situations, however, "components" valuation of the subtra-
hend gives plaintiff his "mark-up profit," and this fact apparently 
gave rise to the terminology. If breach occurs before plaintiff has 
received any payment from defendant, and before plaintiff has 
delivered any performance to defendant, and before plaintiff has 
"on hand" any non-overhead components of performance, all the 
components saved are valued at cost. Indeed, the subtrahend is 
identical to a list of the total costs of contract performance, and 
the minuend is identical to the contract price. The recovery is 
contract price less total costs, plus incidental damages, if any. It 
is only natural to regard such a formula as giving plaintiff his 
"lost profit"-the difference between the contract price and what 
it would have cost him to perform that contract with defendant.243 
When breach occurs after plaintiff has accomplished part of 
his performance, if he still has no non-overhead components on 
hand and has received nothing from defendants, it is possible to 
view the formula as one involving recovery of two items: "lost 
profit" plus "costs incurred."244 Even if plaintiff has both delivered 
ered "lost profits" under a "components" approach. Such an approach was deemed 
inapplicable here both because plaintiff had in fact resold the entity and because the 
mitigation notion required him to do so. Neither defendant nor the court considered 
the possibility of lost volume adjustment, and there is no suggestion of it in plaintiff's 
brief. 
242 In several Michigan cases plaintiff has been a correspondence school and defend• 
ant the disheartened self-educator who broke his contract. The plaintiff invariably 
sought, and failed to get, a price recovery. E.g., \\Talton School of Commerce v. Stroud, 
248 Mich. 85, 226 N.W. 883 (1929); International Text-Book Co. v. Marvin, 166 Mich. 
660, 132 N.W. 437 (1911); International Text-Book Co. v. Jones, 166 Mich. 86, 131 N.W. 
98 (1911); International Textbook Co. v. Schulte, 151 Mich. 149, 114 N.W. 1031 (1908). 
The court, while unwilling tg allow a price recovery (which would value the subtrahend 
at zero), nevertheless indicated that the proper measure of damages would be "the 
difference between the contract price of the course and what it would cost plaintiff 
to give it." Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud, supra at 89, 226 N.W. at 885. This 
apparently would be an example of valuing the subtrahend as an entity and then ad-
justing for lost volume, although the rationale is not elaborated by the court. Perhaps 
the court really had in mind the "components" approach. See also Annot., 78 A.L.R. 
334 (1932). 
243 See Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud, supra note 242; Fell v. Newberry, 106 
Mich. 542, 64 N.W. 474 (1895); Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 (1888). 
244 See Moline Furniture Works v. Club Holding Co., 280 Mich. 587, 274 N.W. 338 
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some performance and received some payment, the "lost profit" 
formulation can be retained by viewing the recovery as consisting 
now of three items: ("lost profit" plus "costs incurred") minus 
such part of the price as has been paid. 245 And even if plaintiff 
has delivered some performance, received some of defendant's per-
formance and has some finished goods on hand but undelivered, 
the flavor can be retained by seeing in the formula four elements: 
("lost profit" plus "costs incurred") minus ("such part of the price 
as has been paid" plus "the market [actual resale] value of the 
finished goods on hand").246 
But this effort to retain the "lost profit" notion at all intel-
lectual costs involves unnecessary steps in computation,247 and 
obscures the justification for this measure of damages.248 More-
over, it invites the judges to treat the "lost profit" involved in 
such suits as they treat "lost profits" in other types of cases-
requiring that the "lost profits" be proved with certainty and be 
foreseeable to defendant at the time of contract as potential items 
of loss in the event of his breach.249 The fact that the "lost profit" 
involved in this components-valued plaintiff-seller suit is markedly 
different from the "lost profits" involved in those other suits is 
thereby obscured.250 
This familiar habit of viewing the components-valued plain-
tiff-seller recovery as one involving recapture of lost profits breeds 
further confusion in regard to suits in which the plaintiff-seller 
seeks to use "entity" valuation with adjustment for lost volume. 
In the latter kind of case plaintiff's recovery can also be regarded 
as one involving "lost profits."251 
(1937); Davey v. Sanders, 253 Mich. 137, 234 N.W. 128 (1931); Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich. 
239 (1872). 
245 See Barrett v. Grand Rapids Veneer Works, 110 Mich. 6, 67 N.W. 976 (1896); 
Atkinson v. Morse, 63 Mich. 276, 29 N.W. 711 (1886); Goodrich v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 62, 
16 N.W. 232 (1883). 
246 Ibid. 
247 See text at note 33 supra. 
248 The "components" approach is not justified merely because plaintiffs in certain 
trades have a peculiar view of their enterprise [See Patterson, Builder's Measure of 
Recovery for Breach of Contract, 31 CoLU!lf. L. REv. 1286, 1293-94 (1931), attempting to 
explain why the builder gets lost profits.], nor because for reasons mysterious the spirit 
of the common law treats certain occupations as peculiar [see note 212 supra], but because 
mitigation notions required or permitted plaintiff to refrain from attempting to com-
plete and resell the entity still undelivered to defendant. 
240 See text supra at 866. 
2uO The distinction was first. recognized in the Fell case in 1895. See text at 
note 81 supra. But this did not forestall the habit of calling the "components" approach 
a "lost profit" recove~. See, e.g., Davey v. San~ers, 253 Mich. 137, 234 N.W. 128 (1931); 
Barrett v. Grand Rapids Veneer Works, 110 Mich. 6, 67 N.W. 976 (1896); Hitchcock v. 
Knights of Maccabees, 100 Mich. 40, 58 N.W. 640 (1894). 
2:;1 In such a suit the term is appropriate. But it should be kept clear that the 
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The notion that there can be two different rationales for 
plaintiff-seller's "lost profit" recovery, each applicable to different, 
but overlapping, sets of fact situations,252 has not reached the court. 
In Mohr Hardware,253 the court seems to have assumed that "lost 
profits" can be recovered by a plaintiff-seller only when the "com-
ponents" approach is justified. The same assumption, with less 
disastrous consequences, was manifest in the two cases in which 
the court reversed "lost profit" recoveries because defendant had 
not been permitted to show a post-breach resale of the entity.2154 
While in neither case does the record suggest that volume was 
lost by the resale, the possibility should not have been foreclosed. 
Another aspect of the confusion seems to be a somewhat fa-
talistic acceptance of the inscrutable ways of the plaintiff-seller's 
"lost profit" recovery. At times court and counsel seem to regard 
it as a peculiarity not susceptible to rational analysis.255 Athol Mfg. 
Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp.,256 discussed earlier,257 may well have 
blundered along its bizarre route because no one felt sure he could 
tell just when "lost profits" should be recovered. The Leonard 
case,258 involving the single sawmill operator who succeeded in 
getting lost profits during Justice Cooley's sawmill reign of terror, 
seems to have thrived on similar confusion. There plaintiff was 
once again faced with repudiation before he started to perform, 
and once again the saved entity was the productive capacity of the 
mill for the season. But this plaintiff had attempted to resell the 
entity and had met with moderate success. Part of the productive 
capacity of the mill was resold (at low rates) although the remain-
der could not be sold. 
"lost profit" is not the one plaintiff would have made on his contract with defendant, 
but on the lost contract he would otherwise have made with the resale purchaser but 
for resale to him. 
252 In some situations plaintiff is entitled to "lost profits" on both rationales; because 
mitigation notions permit him to stop work toward completion of the entity, and be• 
cause resale of the entity would entail lost volume. The court has on occasion reached 
the correct result in such cases, but saw only the single reason-that mitigation 
notions permitted plaintiff to refuse to finish and resell the entity ("components" ap• 
proach). E.g., Nurmi v. Beardsley, 284 Mich. 165, 278 N.W. 805 (1938); Davey v. Sanders, 
253 Mich. 137, 234 N.W. 128 (1931); Scheible v. Klein, 89 Mich. 376, 50 N.W. 857 (1891). 
253 Mohr Hardware Co. v. Dubey, 136 Mich. 677, 100 N.W. 127 (1904). 
254 See Harrington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 166 Mich. 276, 131 N.W. 559 
(1911); Petrie v. Lane, 58 Mich. 527, 25 N.W. 504 (1885). 
255 The court's reluctance to explain the distinction between entity-valued and com• 
ponents-valued cases is striking. See also the discussion of Tradesman in the text supra 
at 904-905, and the judicial opinions in Demirjian at note 230 supra. 
256 222 Mich. 95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923). 
257 See text supra at 894-98. 
2158 Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 (1888). 
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Plaintiff pleaded these facts and repeated them in his opening 
statement, concluding with a prayer for recovery of lost profits. 
The prayer appears strange since neither a "components" ap-
proach2110 nor an "entity" approach with lost volume adjustment260 
would seem appropriate. Conceivably plaintiff could justify the 
prayer on the ground that a "components" approach should be 
used although he attempted to resell the entity because "entity" 
valuation of the subtrahend would give him even larger recovery. 
In any event, the trial judge directed a verdict for defendant 
at that point, influenced by the prior sawmill operator case261 to 
the effect that these mill operators as a class can never recover lost 
profits. When the instant case reached the supreme court on ap-
peal, the retreat from the no-sawmiller-lost-profi.ts-nohow position 
was beginning,262 and the court reversed the verdict directed on 
that theory. Had it stopped there, things would have been well. 
But the court remanded to permit plaintiff to prove his lost 
profits with certainty, if he could, thereby endorsing plaintiff's 
version of the measure of damages. In the later struggle over saw-
miller's recovery of lost profits the case became the plaintiff's 
standby,263 illustrating just when such lost profits can be recovered. 
The probable explanation of the .case is that the court spent its 
attention on the decision to repudiate the flat ban on sawmill 
operator's lost profits and spent little or no thought on whether 
the facts of this case justified this sawmill operator in such a mea-
sure even if the ban were repealed. Defendant never argued for 
an "entity" valuation, being preoccupied in the effort to main-
tain his directed verdict. 
The pattern that seems to emerge from these cases neither 
supports nor vitiates my views. In no case where counsel has made 
appropriate arguments has the court nonetheless ignored them to 
reach an erroneous result. On the other hand, in several cases 
where counsel have failed to make appropriate arguments, the 
court has failed to find them.264 This is true even in those cases 
250 Having attempted to resell the entity he should be permitted to use "entity" 
valuation unless defendant shows he should not have made the attempt. See text supra 
at 900-01. Indeed, if defendant preferred "entity" valuation it should be used. Ibid. The 
trial judge ended the case before defendant took a position on this. 
260 Plaintiff could not handle more contracts without plant expansion and apparently 
planned none. · 
261 Allis v. McLean, 48 Mich. 428, 12 N.W. 640 (1882). 
262 See text at note 79 supra. 
263 Barrett v. Grand Rapids Veneer Works, ll0 Mich. 6, 67 N.W. 976 (1896); Fell· 
v. Newberry, 106 Mich. 542, 64 N.W. 474 (1895). · 
264 From the writer's point of view, Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 222 Mich. 
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where the court was remanding for trial, and where its remarks 
might have prevented confusion on remand.265 
The Michigan legal development, judicial and statutory,266 
never comes to grips267 with two major distinctions: (1) the choice 
between "entity" and "components" approaches; and (2) the choice 
between ordinary entity valuation and entity valuation with an 
adjustment for lost volume. And neither court nor counsel work 
sure-footedly in this area when guided by instinct alone. 
F. Valuing the Lost Volume 
The value of the lost volume is the difference between the 
gross receipts lost and the costs saved when plaintiff was deprived 
of the additional sale. 
Normally the quantity of volume lost is identical to the quan-
tity of the entity resold. But if plaintiff lacked the intent or ability 
to make another sale of that much additional volume, and still 
had such intent and ability as to some lesser volume, that lesser 
volume fixes the quantity term. For example, if plaintiff's factory 
can handle contracts for 40,000 units simultaneously, and defend-
ant's contract was for 15,000 units, and repudiation came while 
the factory had total orders (including defendant's) for 30,000 
units, the lost volume is 10,000 units. 
In proving the lost gross receipts it is necessary to show the 
price of the lost sale. This demonstration is simple if plaintiff al-
ways sells on identical terms to those defendant accepted. It was 
in such a list price context that many courts first recognized the 
lost volume phenomenon.268 But even if plaintiff's price term is 
not fixed, it should be possible to meet the "certainty" test as to the 
lost gross receipts if plaintiff can show the past range of his prices 
95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923), and Mohr Hardware Co. v. Dubey, 136 Mich. 677, 100 N.W. 
127 (1904), were wrongly decided. And Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 
(1888), Harrington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 166 Mich. 276, 131 N.W. 559 (1911), 
and Petrie v. Lane, 58 Mich. 527, 25 N.W. 504 (1885), may have been erroneous, although 
the facts are scanty. In none of them was the proper argument made by counsel. 
265 E.g., Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., supra note 264; Harrington-Wiard 
Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., supra note 264; Leonard v. Beaudry, supra note 264; Petrie 
v. Lane, supra note 264. 
266 See discussion of UNIFORM SALES Ar:::r § 64(4) [MxcH. CoMP. LAws § 440.64(4) (1948)] 
at note 181 supra. 
267 See note 168 supra. 
268 E.g., Torkomian v. Russell, 90 Conn. 481, 97 Atl. 760 (1916); Stewart v. Hansen, 
62 Utah 281,218 Pac. 959 (1923); Thompson v. Robinson, [1955] 1 Ch. 177. See Comment, 
65 YALE L.J. 992 (1956); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 1008 (1952). Comment 2 to UNIFORM COM• 
MERCIAL Com~ § 2-708 stresses "fixed price articles" and "standard priced goods" as 
appropriate for "lost profit" treatment under § 2-708(2). 
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and is willing to fix the gross receipts at the bottom of that range.269 
Proof of saved variable costs varies somewhat from the treat-
ment of non-overhead items under a "components" approach. 
There a distinction was drawn between "on hand" and "yet to 
be acquired" items. This was feasible because the particular con-
tract, wholly or partially unperformed by plaintiff, could be iden-
tified with precision: it was the contract with defendant. In 
computing the value of saved volume the unperformed contract 
normally cannot be identified with precision, so it is not possible 
to show whether it would have been performed with "on hand" 
or "yet to be acquired" non-overhead components. 
The court should presume that it would have been performed 
with "yet to be acquired" non-overhead items, and should value all 
such items at cost. This will value them accurately if, as is usually 
the case, the reduction in plaintiff's volume of sales causes him 
to reduce proportionately the volume of non-overhead items he 
acquires from his suppliers. In the one case in which the Michigan 
Supreme Court may have approved a lost volume adjustment, its 
value was established in this fashion.270 
Valuing the saved overhead costs of the lost volume presents 
the same problems seen earlier when saved overhead was dis-
cussed as one category of a "components" approach. No Michigan 
case has raised this problem. The only Michigan case dealing with 
the burden of proving various aspects of the lost volume held that 
plaintiff has the burden of showing that he could have had an-
other contract in addition to those he had at the time of breach.271 
This accords with the views presented in my prior article concen1-
ing burden of proving lost volume.272 In view of the dearth of 
Michigan decisions, further discussion of the burden of proof 
problems seems needless. 
V. CONCLUSION 
No Michigan case in which counsel presented appropriate 
arguments to the court reached a result inconsistent with the 
260 Cf. Moon Motor Car Co. v. Moon Motor Car Co., 29 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1928); 
Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Egerton, 288 Fed. 698 (4th Cir. 1923); Dolly Parker Motors, 
Inc. v. Stinson, 220 Ark. 28, 245 S.W.2d 820 (1952). See also Waters, The Concept of 
Market in the Sale of Goods, 36 CAN. B. REv. 360 (1958). 
270 Demirjian v. Kurtis, 353 Mich. 619, 91 N.W.2d 841 (1958). See text supra at 911-13. 
271 Petric v. Lane, 67 Mich. 454, 35 N.W. 70 (1887). 
272 See Harris, A General Theory for Measuring Seller's Damages for Total Breach 
of Contract, 60 MICH. L. REv. 577, 601 (1962). 
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views set forth here. In Athol273 and Mohr Hardware results dif-
ferent from those which the writer would endorse were reached, 
but in both instances counsel failed to make proper arguments. 
In Leonard and the second Petrie case274 the results may have 
been discrepant (it being hard to tell since both cases were de-
cided on the pleadings and opening statements), but again counsel 
failed to present their views properly. In Tradesman the result 
was proper, but the dictum was either discrepant or deceiving. 
The court's treatment of the various categories of components 
in cases where that approach is used, and its treatment of the 
entity in cases where the "entity" approach is identical to the 
"components" approach, correlates perfectly with my views, and 
suggests that the court's analysis is quite similar. But when a 
choice arises between "entity" and "components" approaches, or 
when the court must handle an "entity" approach in a case where 
the "entity" and "components" approaches differ, the court does 
not seem to be travelling the same route as that indicated here. 
And when the problem of lost volume arises, the court seems quite 
unaware of the concepts here described. Perhaps the court is 
struggling for some such concepts, but it would not be fair to 
say that my views are merely an articulation of the court's tacit 
notions in such cases. 
While this article was designed to test my hypothesis against 
the Michigan experience, I cannot resist adding a suggestion for 
the future. Michigan has recently made pre-trial mandatory in 
all civil actions.275 It would appear from the cases where counsel 
has failed to carry the burden on some subtrahend item because 
he was unaware until too late that he had the burden, that pre-
trial discussion of the contract damage issues would be time well 
spent even if it did no more than apprise counsel of the perils 
ahead. And if on occasion stipulations were forthcoming about 
such matters as whether "components" or "entity" valuation was 
to be used, the time spent at pre-trial would save much more time 
at the actual trial. Where complex issues of contract damages are 
tried to a jury the possibilities of confusion are grave enough in 
the best of circumstances; if pre-trial can simplify some of these 
issues it would' p~y dividends in improved justice. 
273 See text supra at 894-98. 
274 Petrie v. Lane, 67 Mich. 454, 35 N.W. 70 (1887). 
275 MICH. CT. R. 35. . 
